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ABSTRACT

QUO VADIS – NATO AND THE BALKANS? IS THERE A CHANCE FOR A SUCCESSFUL EXIT STRATEGY? by LtCol (GS) Jörg K.W. Vollmer, FRG, 68 pages

What started in 1995 as a one year commitment of NATO troops to implement the Dayton peace accord in Bosnia and Herzegovina has developed into a still ongoing mission there since 1996, an additional mission in Kosovo since 1999 and several minor missions in Macedonia since 2001. Still until today about 50.000 troops are stationed in the successor states of former Yugoslavia. To decide to withdraw militarily is a political decision, which will be based on the success achieved politically. To get a better understanding of this process it is necessary to understand the new security environment in the 1990s and its impact on how organizations, especially the United Nations and the Alliance, have had to change their understanding of each others roles and responsibilities and how the states involved in this process influenced it by translating domestic policies into foreign relationships and power projections. To understand why decisions have been made always requires viewing them in their historical context and taking into consideration the background of acting persons and institutions as well.

To achieve a stable situation in post conflict situations as for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo Clausewitz's theory helps to develop a common understanding of what has to be achieved to establish a stable and well balanced end state. Clausewitz's term of center of gravity helps to focus all efforts to achieve ones own goals. For the Balkans the desired end state can be defined as 'a stable region aimed at economic integration and security cooperation with sovereign states who guarantee sovereign political decisions of democratically elected governments, based on respect of human rights, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and which refrain from using force against other states and from using violence against their own people or ethnic minorities.'

NATO's troops have fulfilled their initial missions. What is missing, are complementary results of all the other organizations involved. This does not mean that SFOR and KFOR can leave, since the paradox situation on the ground implies that they have to further on have to secure the environment. But that the same foreign and defense ministers – and on an occasionally basis the Heads of State and Government – of NATO who several times prolonged the deployments of their troops should develop greater pressure on their own governments as well as on the organizations involved in the peace process to provide the necessary means to foster the political processes in the successor states in former Yugoslavia.

The recommendations concerning future involvement of NATO in the successor states of former Yugoslavia are twofold. Without doubt the Alliance has proven its value in providing political and military assistance to end the wars and install a secure environment. The political weight as a transatlantic alliance should be used to increase the pressure on the other organizations involved to proceed with their work and it should be made clear that NATO presence on the ground must be reduced to the smallest extent possible to get troops and capabilities free for other more pressing issues on the international agenda. During this reshaping and restructuring process all mission changes, which – at the time when they occurred – were appropriate to successful implement the peace process should be reviewed, and wherever appropriate be cut back to the basic functions.

NATO's military forces will have to face a longer commitment in the region since they are so far the only guarantee for a peaceful settlement and all political developments are relying on the secure environment they provide. But the focus has to shift. The centers of gravity, the governments of the successor states, are purely political. To get them to work or function is not the mission of military forces. Any exit strategy for NATO will have to take this into consideration. It should be accepted that this will take its time.

**Quo Vadis – NATO and the Balkans?
Is there a chance for a successful exit strategy?**

**A Monograph
by
LtCol (GS) Jörg K.W. Vollmer
German Army**



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
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
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
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1. Introduction

"Finding the right place for NATO in the pantheon of international and European institutions has not been easy. Nations are rightly jealous of their prerogatives, and it was clear early in the Dayton discussions in 1995 that the major European powers sought to prevent what they feared would be an American-dominated NATO military force in Bosnia from establishing authority over non-military matters. ... European fears were complemented by the American resistance to 'mission creep'."¹

General Wesley K. Clark, former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 2001

"In an uncertain world, NATO is not an optional extra. It is the embodiment of the transatlantic bond, the fundamental guarantor of Euro-Atlantic stability and security, and the essential platform for defense cooperation and coalition operations."²

NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, 3 February 2002

Today NATO is involved in providing security for the ongoing peace building process in the successor states of former Yugoslavia. To get there has been a long way and during this time several adaptation processes took place. NATO during this time has adapted its strategic concept twice from a purely defensive posture to a broader concept of security of ensuring the defense of its member states and contributing to peace and stability with a variety of initiatives and missions. What started in 1995 as a one year commitment to implement the Dayton peace accord in Bosnia and Herzegovina has developed into a still ongoing mission of NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996, an additional mission in Kosovo of its Kosovo Force (KFOR) since 1999 and several minor missions in Macedonia since 2001. Although the number of troops could be downsized several times, still until today about 50.000 troops are stationed in the successor states of former Yugoslavia.

To answer the question of how and when these troop deployments can be withdrawn it is necessary to understand how and why they got there. The political developments in Europe between 1989 and 1991 seem to be already far away and the following ten years with an ongoing

¹ General Wesley K. Clark, *Waging Modern War* (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p. 444

² NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, "NATO's Future", Speech at the Conference on Security Policy, in Munich, 3 February 2002, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020203a.htm>, accessed 02/04/02

adaptation of international rules and settings as well. Decisions made in 1995 to finally put NATO in charge of implementing a secure environment as precondition for political and economical solutions have to be understood in the political and historical framework at their time. To decide to withdraw militarily is a political decision, which will be based on the success achieved politically. To get a better understanding of this process it is necessary to understand the new security environment in the 1990s and its impact on how organizations, especially the United Nations and the Alliance, have had to change their understanding of each others roles and responsibilities and how the states involved in this process influenced it by translating domestic policies into foreign relationships and power projections.

Yugoslavia became a catalyst in this process. At the beginning in 1991 the attention of the international community was drawn to other places and developments, but in the end the results and implications of the secession wars in the former states of Yugoslavia made it necessary to change the emphasis and decisions from some kind – in retrospective – ‘muddling through’ to a more cohesive and decisive approach by using the best available means to come to grips with the situation. Questions to be answered by assessing these developments should lead to an identification of the centers of gravity and the decisive points to influence them and to come to the desired end state, a peaceful and lasting settlement of the conflicts in former Yugoslavia.

To answer the question “Quo vadis - NATO and the Balkans? – Is there a chance for a successful exit strategy?” requires to understand of who is in charge and by doing so to evaluate the so often asked question if the missions of the military are still in line or if they have changed in a way which no longer allows for a foreseeable redeployment of the troops. Only by understanding the history of the region in special and by understanding the decision making processes of the sovereign nations who got engaged singularly and through organizations and alliances will help to provide conclusions and recommendations for the future.

2. A new security environment

"Force should never be a substitute for diplomacy - but under the right conditions it can give strength to the search for political solutions represented by diplomacy."³

Carl Bildt, former Prime Minister of Sweden; presently the UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy for the Balkans; having served as UN High Representative in Bosnia, 2000

Changes in the European political landscape

On 1 April 2001 Slobodan Milosevic was arrested by local authorities in Belgrade and two months later, on 29 June 2001 transferred to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, where on the basis of his individual responsibility under Article 7(1) and superior criminal responsibility under Article 7(3) of the statute he is charged and being held responsible with genocide, crimes against humanity involving persecution, extermination, murder, imprisonment, torture, deportation and inhumane acts and several other severe indictments in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1987 until late 2000, in Croatia between at least August 1991 and June 1992 and finally in Kosovo between October 1998 and June 20, 1999.⁴ With Milosevic the last one of the three most prominent leaders of the decade-long conflict in the former Yugoslavia and signers of the Dayton Peace Agreement has left the scene: former Croatian President Franjo Tudjman died in December 1999 and Bosnian President Alija Izetbegovic resigned due to old age in October 2000.⁵ During their presidencies, not only the former Yugoslavia has been divided and been a place of several severe civil wars but also a change in international

³ Carl Bildt, "Force and Diplomacy," in *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 141-148, p. 148

⁴ Compare ICTY, Case Information Sheets "Milosevic Case (IT-01-51) The Indictment 'Bosnia and Herzegovina' as of 26 November 2001"; "Milosevic Case (IT-01-50) The Indictment 'Croatia' as of 09 October 2001", "Milosevic Case (IT-99-37-I) The Indictment 'Kosovo' as of 14 January 2002", all 3 cases available from <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm>; Internet accessed 01/25/02. On 25 May 1993 in the face of the serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, and as a response to the threat to international peace and security posed by those serious violations, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by Security Council resolution 827. The ICTY's mission is (1) to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for violations of international humanitarian law, (2) to render justice to the victims, (3) to deter further crimes and (4) to contribute to the restoration of peace by promoting reconciliation in the former Yugoslavia. (ICTY, General Information, available from <http://www.un.org/icty/glance/index.htm>; accessed 01/25/02)

⁵ Carl Bildt, "A Second Chance in the Balkans, in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 80, No. 1, January/February 2001, pp. 148-158, p. 148

understanding of how to react to these atrocities has taken place. But not only Yugoslavia has changed during the last twelve years but also many of the organizations which have been and still are involved in the remnants of this country. The intent of this chapter is to sum up the changes that have taken place over the last twelve years and especially those which have shaped and developed NATO's vision of a New Alliance "able to undertake new missions including contributing to effective conflict prevention and *engaging actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations*."⁶ To answer the question of how NATO will be able to leave the Balkans one must understand of how and why the Alliance got there.

Mikhail Gorbachev's initiatives as General Secretary of the Soviet Union (1985-91) of *Glasnost* (openness) and *Perestroika* (restructuring) in an attempt to modernize communism in the USSR inadvertently released forces that by December 1991 splintered the Soviet Union into 15 independent republics.⁷ The opening of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and within less than a year, on 3 October 1990, the unification of the two German states were part of a wider process intended to lead to a genuinely whole and free Europe. The revolutionary events that occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from 1989 to 1991 did away with the Cold War system that had dominated the European continent for four decades. They allowed greater room for maneuver by states, and for many of the East European states they paved the way into economic and secu-

⁶ Washington Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on 24 April 1999, para 2, published in NATO, *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington 23-25 April 1999*, p. 13-23

⁷ Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belorussia (now Belarus), Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. By December 1991 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania had achieved complete independence and were internationally recognized as sovereign states, and several others were demanding independence. Attempts were made, led by Mikhail Gorbachev to establish a new "Union of Sovereign States" with some degree of integration in foreign policy, defense, and economic affairs, but agreement among the remaining 12 republics was not achieved. Whatever the legal position, the union republics had begun to act as if they were sovereign states and were negotiating with each other, bypassing the vestigial central government. This process culminated on Dec. 8, 1991, in the signing of an agreement between the three Slav republics of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus for the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), with an agreed common policy for foreign affairs and defense. The CIS later came to include all the remaining republics except Georgia, but great difficulty was experienced in arriving at agreed policies. There could be no disagreement with the statement by the leaders of the Commonwealth that "the U.S.S.R. has ceased to exist as a geopolitical reality."; "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" Encyclopædia Britannica; available from <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=108436&tocid=0&query=soviet%20union>; accessed 01/28/2002

rity integration with the West via closer ties to NATO, the EC, and the WEU.⁸ Although not all political developments in Europe were free of violence, in the end most of the problems and challenges occurring in the late 1980's and early 1990's could be settled within the scope of existing organizations, international agreements and by the use of accepted rules and procedures: the dissolution of the former Warsaw Pact and later of the former Soviet Union itself;⁹ the withdrawal of millions of Soviet and later Russian troops from Polish and German soil until the end of 1994; the peaceful separation of former Czechoslovakia in December 1992 into its two national components, the Czech Republic and Slovakia;¹⁰ the relief of the communist dominated government in Romania in 1996 following the violent overthrow of its decades-long President Nicolae Ceausescu in late 1989; and not at least the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland in NATO in 1999 as a sweeping symbol of NATO's significant role in a changing transatlantic security environment. On the other hand the last decade of the 20th century has borne witness to some of the deadliest conflicts of an all too deadly century, assessing thirty-seven major armed conflicts in the 1990s and casualties exceeding four million.¹¹ Some of these conflicts received

⁸ Dr. Jacob W. Kipp, Timothy L. Thomas, "International Ramifications of Yugoslavia's Serial Wars: the Challenge of Ethno-national Conflicts for a Post-Cold-War, European Order," *Foreign Military Studies Office*, Ft. Leavenworth, 1994, p. 8

⁹ Formally Warsaw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, And Mutual Assistance (May 14, 1955-July 1, 1991); establishing a mutual-defense organization composed originally of the Soviet Union and Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. (Albania withdrew in 1968, and East Germany did so in 1990.) The treaty (which was renewed on April 26, 1985) provided for a unified military command and for the maintenance of Soviet military units on the territories of the other participating states. The Warsaw Pact was formally declared "nonexistent" on July 1, 1991, at a final summit meeting of Warsaw Pact leaders in Prague. "Warsaw Pact" Encyclopædia Britannica; <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=78155&tocid=0&query=warzaw%20pact>; accessed 01/28/02

¹⁰ In June 1990, in the first free elections held in Czechoslovakia since 1946, the Civic Forum movement and the Slovak counterpart won decisive majorities in both houses of parliament. The new government undertook the multifarious tasks of transition, including privatizing businesses, revamping foreign policy, and writing a new constitution. The drafting of a new constitution was hindered by differences between parties, Czech-Slovak tensions, and power struggles. In July 1992 the assumption was made, at least in political circles that the state would have to be divided. Negotiations between the two republics took place in an atmosphere of peace and cooperation, though there was little evidence of public enthusiasm. By late November, members of the National Assembly had voted Czechoslovakia out of existence and themselves out of their jobs. Both republics promulgated new constitutions, and at midnight on December 31, 1992 Czechoslovakia was formally dissolved. "Czechoslovak region, history of" Encyclopædia Britannica; <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?query=czechoslovakia&eu=118031&tocid=42122>; accessed 01/28/02

¹¹ Bruce W. Jentleson, "Preventive Diplomacy: A Conceptual and Analytic Framework," in Bruce W. Jentleson (Editor), *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000),

prominent recognition by the international community and especially by the United States of America, as for example the Gulf War in 1990-91, Somalia in 1992-93, Haiti in 1994 and in a more reluctant way the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, which Bruce W. Jentleson calls some kind of a "'full plate' problem of other more pressing issues preoccupying policymakers."¹² Despite the absence among American and European policymakers of a perceived interest in the outcome of the Yugoslavian conflicts in 1991 and 1992, finally the events in Yugoslavia should have had the greatest impact on changing the understanding of the role of the United Nations, NATO, and preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping in general since "in no other area has the relationship between force and diplomacy been to such a test, and been the subject of such controversy."¹³

The United Nations – from Peacekeeping to Peace Enforcement

Immediately after the end of the Cold War the expectations for a renaissance of global and multilateral diplomacy were great and with that in mind the UN claimed an even greater role and responsibility.¹⁴ In 1992 UN's Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali envisioned in his Agenda for Peace "that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter - a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security, of securing justice and human rights and of promoting, in the words of the Charter, 'social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom', an opportunity not be squandered."¹⁵ So far UN peacekeeping operations had been understood as operations conducted by small forces, armed only for self-defense and deployed between factions after formal or informal cessation of hostilities, with the

p. 3-20, p. 4

¹² Ibid, p. 12

¹³ Susan L. Woodward, "Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985-1991," in Bruce W. Jentleson (Editor), *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized*, (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), p. 133-172, p. 144; "in no other area..." comment by Carl Bildt, "Force and Diplomacy," *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 141-148, p. 142

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 141

¹⁵ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace - Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping", Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, available from <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html>; accessed 01/25/02, para 3, p. 1

consent of the factions and to provide impartial reassurance to all sides that the cease-fire is being observed.¹⁶ Although Peacekeeping has "traditionally" been carried out under the auspices of the UN, it is not explicitly referred to in the UN Charter, but by extending the interpretation of the Charter's Chapter VI on the peaceful resolution of conflicts it served as a creative way of overcoming the problem of superpower rivalry, which all too often left the Security Council deadlocked and prevented it from exercising its authority under Chapter VII on actions with respect to threats to the peace.¹⁷ In his Agenda for Peace Boutros-Boutros Ghali defined *Peacekeeping* as "the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well, ... a technique that expands the possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace."¹⁸ Consequently he defined *Preventive Diplomacy* as an "action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur" and *Peacemaking* as an "action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations."¹⁹ To sum it up in his own words: "Preventive diplomacy seeks to resolve disputes before violence breaks out; peacemaking and peace-keeping are required to halt conflicts and preserve peace once it is attained. If successful, they strengthen the opportunity for post-conflict peace-building, which can prevent the recurrence of violence among nations and peoples."²⁰

Besides these definitions he laid out some other ideas which influenced the way conflicts were solved during the upcoming years as for example that "the time has come to plan for circumstances warranting *preventive deployment*, which could take place in a variety of instances

¹⁶ David Jablonsky; James S. McCallum, "Peace implementation and the concept of induced consent in peace operations," in *Parameters*, Vol. 29, Spring 1999, pp. 54-70, p. 54

¹⁷ Espen Barth Eide, "Peacekeeping past and present", *NATO Review*, Web edition, Vol. 49, No. 2, Summer 2001, pp.6-8, p.6; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-01.htm>; accessed 08/28/01

¹⁸ Boutros-Boutros Ghali, "An Agenda for Peace", para 20, p. 4

¹⁹ Ibid, para 20, p. 4

²⁰ Ibid, para 21, p. 5

and ways, ... including interstate and intra-state conflicts.”²¹ For those cases where the mission of forces would be to respond to outright aggression, imminent or actual, their task could on occasion exceed the mission of peacekeeping forces and thus he recommended, “that the Council considers the utilization of *peace-enforcement* units in clearly defined circumstances and with their terms of reference specified in advance.”²²

It was a long way between these first signs of a changing reality of UN missions and the assessment of the “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations” by Lakhdar Brahimi, Chairman of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued in August 2000.²³ Yugoslavia during this time can be seen as some kind of “test bed” for these developing doctrines and political understandings of the use of forces under or by the mandate of the UN Security Council. The so-called Brahimi Report finally states what should have been common understanding as early as 1991 but took nine years to be finally agreed upon: “once deployed, United Nations peacekeepers must be able to carry out their mandates professionally and successfully and be capable of defending themselves, other mission components and the mission’s mandate, with robust rules of engagement, against those who renege on their commitments to a peace accord or otherwise seek to undermine it by violence.”²⁴ In his report Brahimi also clearly stated, that the UN’s mistakes of the 1990s with respect to changing mandates, missions and poorly resourced operations should not be repeated.²⁵

²¹ Ibid, para 28, p. 7

²² Ibid, para 44, p. 10

²³ “For the United Nations, the combination of difficult experiences in the Balkans and the challenges and realities of missions in Rwanda, Somalia and most recently East Timor led in 2000 to the creation of a panel under Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi and the commissioning of a report on the future of UN peacekeeping.” David Lightburn, “Lessons Learned,” *NATO Review*, Web edition, Vol. 49, No. 2, Summer 2001, pp.12-15, p.12; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-03.htm>; accessed 08/28/01

²⁴ Lakhdar Brahimi, “Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations”, *United Nations A/55/305-S/2000/809*, 21 August 2000, p. 26

²⁵ David Lightburn, “Lessons Learned”, p. 13

NATO's new missions – The new Strategic Concept

NATO in 1991 was not prepared to accept these changes, not even so far as to consider peacekeeping operations in its broader sense to be part of NATO's tasks. Taking the political changes in the Soviet Union and in East Europe at all into consideration the Heads of State and Government of NATO member nations at their Summit Meeting in London in July 1990 were mainly concerned of how to influence these changes in a way which would further foster the security of all its member states and "to transform the Alliance in a manner commensurate with the new security environment and to bring confrontation between East and West to an end."²⁶ Consequently the new Strategic Concept, written, debated and discussed within the Alliance starting in July 1990 and finally completed in November 1991 emphasized cooperation with former adversaries as opposed to confrontation. It clearly focused on the security of its member nations as its fundamental purpose but combined this with the specific obligation to work towards improved and expanded security for a Europe as a whole.²⁷ The fundamental task of the Alliance was described as follows:

The means by which the Alliance pursues its security policy to preserve the peace will continue to include the maintenance of a military capability sufficient to prevent war and to provide for effective defense; an overall capability to manage successfully crises affecting the security of its members; and the pursuit of political efforts favoring dialogue with other nations and the active search for a cooperative approach to European security, including in the field of arms control and disarmament.²⁸

²⁶ *NATO Handbook*, (Brussels: NATO, 1998), p. 62

²⁷ NATO, *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington 23-25 April 1999*, p. 64

The initial formulation of NATO strategy was known as "The Strategic Concept for the Defence of the North Atlantic Area". Developed between October 1949 and April 1950, it set out a strategy of large-scale operations for territorial defense. In the mid-1950s the strategy of "massive retaliation" was developed. It emphasized deterrence based on the threat that NATO would respond to any aggression against its member countries by every means at its disposal, specifically including nuclear weapons. Discussions of possible changes in this strategic approach began later in the 1950s and continued until 1967 when, following intensive debate within the Alliance, "massive retaliation" was replaced by the strategy of "flexible response". The 1991 Strategic Concept was for the first time issued as a public document, open for discussion and comment by parliaments, security specialists, journalists and the wider public. Ibid, p. 63-64

²⁸ NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council", Rome, 8 November 1991, para 19, p. 4; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/b911108a.htm>; assessed 01/26/02

The change in NATO's strategic concept resulted in a substantial reduction in conventional and nuclear forces and consequently its military strategy shifted from positional defense based upon Main Defense Forces to Immediate and Rapid Reaction Forces and Augmentation Forces.²⁹ Tasks beyond defense were described in paragraphs 31 to 33 under the subtitle of "Management of crisis and conflict prevention" and kept intentionally very vague:

In the new political and strategic environment in Europe, the success of the Alliance's policy of preserving peace and preventing war depends even more than in the past on the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful management of crises affecting the security of its members. (...). In these new circumstances there are increased opportunities for the successful resolution of crises at an early stage. The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach determined by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and coordinating appropriate crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other measures, including those in the military field.³⁰

NATO in 1991 still had a "collective defense mindset and structure" and "in both political and military circles of NATO member countries, there was a deep reluctance to shed NATO's collective defense capabilities, structures and missions for the uncharted world of 'non-Article 5 missions'."³¹ To further verify the 1991 statement of the strategic concept of "coordinating appropriate crisis management ... including those in the military field", NATO needed another year, and two more North Atlantic Council meetings in Ministerial sessions of the Foreign Ministers. First, in Oslo in June 1992 NATO's Foreign Ministers announced the Alliance's readiness "to support, on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with their own procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; later renamed Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; OSCE), including making available Alliance Resources and expertise for peacekeeping operations". Finally in Brussels, in

²⁹ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, 4, Autumn 2000, pp. 705-735, p. 718; "By 1999, NATO land, sea, and air units had been reduced by 30-40%, with only 35-60% kept at a thirty-day readiness level (compared with 70-90% kept at a minimum of two days readiness in 1990). In 1991, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to eliminate ground based theater nuclear forces, and NATO reduced its deployed theater nuclear forces by 80%."

³⁰ NATO, "The Alliance's Strategic Concept agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council", Rome, 8 November 1991, para 31-32, p. 6

³¹ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War", p. 719

December 1992, they stated that "the Alliance was also ready to support peacekeeping operations under the authority of the United Nations Security Council."³²

To put these political decisions into an agreed document of a "Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations" took several years. Although a first version had been worked out by the International Military Staff at NATO's Headquarters in Brussels as early as 1993, called "MC 327 - Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations", it did not get the agreement of the NATO Council and thus was formally agreed upon only on the level of the Military Committee. It was not a binding document for all NATO members. Instead of achieving a common understanding of all sixteen members at this time an "Ad Hoc Working Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping" in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) was tasked to set out a common understanding on conceptual approaches and a common program for practical peacekeeping arrangements with partners in cooperation with partners.³³ A first report was issued at the NACC Ministerial meeting in Athens in 1993 and its follow-on report endorsed in 1995.³⁴ In the following years and by taking the experiences made during NATO's involvements during the several wars and crises in and around the former Yugoslavia, MC 327 has been adapted and was finally noted under silence procedure by the NATO Council as a "living Document" on 18 February 1998 with the "purpose to provide a conceptual reference to guide the planning and conduct of Peace Support Operations (PSO) within NATO, with Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, and

³² *NATO Handbook*, Brussels 1998, p. 113

³³ The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) first met in December 1991 and was established to help break down East-West divisions and build up mutual trust in the wake of the end of the Cold War by bringing together NATO Allies with former Warsaw Pact countries in a forum for security dialogue and cooperation. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was created in 1997 to replace the NACC and build on its achievements. Aimed at promoting transparency and generating mutual confidence, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) brings together 27 Partners and 19 Allies for regular consultations on issues encompassing all aspects of security and all regions of the Euro-Atlantic area. Meetings take place regularly at the level of ambassadors, foreign and defense ministers, and chiefs of defense. Occasionally, heads of state and government gather for summit meetings, as they did in Washington in April 1999. NATO, "Partnership and Cooperation, Fact sheet as of October 2001, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm>, accessed 01/23/2002

³⁴ MC 327/1 (Final) "Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations" - NATO Unclassified - , 18 February 1998, para 6 b, p. 3

other organizations as appropriate.”³⁵ *Peace Support Operations* are defined as “multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/OSCE mandate involving military forces and diplomatic and humanitarian agencies and are designed to achieve a long term political settlement or other conditions specified in the mandate and they include peacekeeping and peace enforcement as well as conflict prevention, peacemaking, peace building and humanitarian operations.”³⁶ While *Peacekeeping operations* are “generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all Parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate implementation of a peace agreement”, *Peace Enforcement operations* on the other hand “are undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, coercive in nature and conducted when the consent of all Parties to a conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain and are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.”³⁷ To be successful, Peace Enforcement forces “must be organized, equipped, trained and deployed to achieve their operational objectives and thus be able, should the conflicting parties not be deterred and fail to comply with the mandate, to react adequately, based upon robust Rules of Engagement (ROE).”³⁸

The development of these criteria, basic rules and agreements at the strategic and political level went hand in glove with the developments “on the ground”, which included the use of air and maritime forces, at the tactical and operational level. For NATO, the deployment of troops was based on political decisions made in the capitals of their member states and in consensus at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, the operational planning and use of force was based on an ongoing process of developing a common understanding and the overarching understanding of NATO’s strategic goals in this new field of operations. This system was finally defined and

³⁵ Ibid, para 1, p. 1; Decisions by NATO are either made in the appropriate bodies, in this case by the NATO Council, by vote, and any decision has to be agreed upon in (personal) consensus or by “silence procedure”. The latter describes a common decision making process usually initiated by the office of the secretary general to get agreement on a decision by drafting a memo to the permanent representatives of all the member countries, in which the decision to be agreed upon is written down and a timeline set until when opposing or other opinions can be raised. If no one “breaks silence” the decision is unanimously accepted.

³⁶ MC 327/1 (Final) “Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations”, para 7 a, p. 4

³⁷ Ibid, para 7 b, c, p. 4

³⁸ Ibid, para 8 c, p. 5

agreed upon in NATO's – second - New Strategic Concept, approved by their Heads of State and Government at the Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999. Here for the first time under the subtitle of "Purpose and Tasks of the Alliance" Crisis Management was added to the overarching task of Deterrence and Defense and described as "to stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis response operations."³⁹

That this commitment is intended to be truly a basis for further NATO tasks and missions and more than just a political statement is justified by the text of the whole Strategic Concept, which incorporates this "new commitment" into an overarching approach of NATO's commitments, missions and forces, when it states:

Military capabilities effective under the full range of foreseeable circumstances are also the basis of the Alliance's ability to contribute to conflict prevention and crisis management through *non-Article 5 crisis response operations*. (Para 29)

NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, including through the possibility of *conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations*. NATO recalls its offer, made in Brussels in 1994, to support on a case-by-case basis in accordance with its own procedures, peacekeeping and other operations under the authority of the UN Security Council or the responsibility of the OSCE, *including by making available Alliance resources and expertise*. (Para 31)

(The combined military forces of the Alliance) must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention *and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations*. (Para 41)⁴⁰

³⁹ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept" approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on 23 and 24 April 1999, para 10, published in NATO, *The Reader's Guide to the NATO Summit in Washington 23-25 April 1999*, p. 47-60

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 47-60, highlighted by Author; compare also:

"... its commitment, exemplified in the Balkans, to conflict prevention and crisis management, including through *peace support operations*" (Para 12)

"(The combined military forces of the Alliance) must also be prepared to contribute to conflict prevention *and to conduct non-Article 5 crisis response operations*." (Para 41)

"NATO forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defense while conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations." (Para 47)

"The Alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations (and) may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organizations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security." (Para 48)

"In contributing to the management of crises through military operations, the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian

The adoption of the new Strategic Concept, the evolution of NATO's mission from exclusively territorial defense to ensuring security actively in its broadest sense throughout Europe was completed.⁴¹ The changes of the security environment starting with the "Velvet Revolution" in Eastern Europe in 1989 have changed the circumstances under which NATO forces are provided and deployed and they have brought a different understanding of how forces can and will be provided under the overarching principles of the politics of the Alliance. Peacekeeping and especially Peace Enforcement have a different meaning from twelve years ago, including the role of the United Nations, NATO and single nations.

emergencies. Some non-Article 5 crisis response operations may be as demanding as some collective defense missions." (Para 49)

"The principle of collective effort in Alliance defense is embodied in practical arrangements that (...) also enable NATO's forces to carry out non-Article 5 crisis response operations and constitute a prerequisite for a coherent Alliance response to all possible contingencies, (...) including planning, for crisis management and reinforcement." (Para 43)

"The size, readiness, availability and deployment of the Alliance's military forces will reflect its commitment to collective defense and to conduct crisis response operations, sometimes at short notice, distant from their home stations, including beyond the Allies' territory." (Para 52)

⁴¹ Ivo H. Daalder, James M. Goldgeier, „Putting Europe First," *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 1, Spring 2001, pp. 71-91, p. 81

3. Catalyst Yugoslavia

"And while today the headlines may be about Bosnia, tomorrow they may be about a different area of the Balkans, for the whole peninsula has entered a cataclysmic period that will last for many years"⁴²

Robert Kaplan, 1993

"In the meantime, there was never a Balkan war in the 1990s. Neither Greece, nor Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, or Turkey has been at war despite the constant implications to that effect in the Western Press. All of them have been careful to avoid any temptation to get involved. The war in the 1990s was a war for the Yugoslav succession."⁴³

Maria Todorova, 2000

Developments in the Balkan States

According to the Encyclopædia Britannica,

the Balkan, also called Balkan Peninsula, comprises the states of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Moldova. These states, containing more than 60 million people, occupy an area of 257,400 square miles. The region is bordered by Italy on the northwest, Austria and Hungary on the north, Ukraine on the north and northeast, and Greece and Turkey on the south. The Adriatic Sea in the west, the Ionian Sea in the southwest, and the Black Sea in the east wash it. In the north, clear geographic delimitation of the Balkans becomes difficult, because the Great Hungarian Plain extends from central Europe into parts of Croatia, Serbia, and Romania. Greece is primarily a Mediterranean country, although its northern regions of Epirus and Macedonia can be considered parts of the Balkans. The word Balkan is Turkish and means "Mountain," and the peninsula is certainly dominated by this type of landform, especially in the west. The peculiar nature identified with "Balkanization" - that is, fragmentation of ethnic groups - derives in part from the compartmentalization brought about by this mountainous relief.⁴⁴

⁴² Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts—A Journey through History*, (New York: St. Martins Press, 1993), p. X. Richard Holbrooke offers an interesting and remarkable assessment of Kaplan's book and its influence on U.S. policymakers: "... Robert Kaplan's widely acclaimed 1993 best-seller, *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History*, (...) left most of its readers with the sense that nothing could be done by outsiders in a region so steeped in ancient hatreds. According to numerous press reports, the book had a profound impact on President Clinton and other members of the Administration shortly after they came into office." Holbrooke also makes clear that "Kaplan has stated repeatedly that he did not intend to have this effect. His book is primarily about Greece and Romania. It devotes less than four chapters out of seventeen to the former Yugoslavia, mentions Sarajevo only once and Mostar not at all, and has only twelve references to Bosnia." Richard Holbrooke, *To end a War* (New York: Random House, 1998), p. 22

⁴³ Maria Todorova, "The Balkans: From Invention to Intervention," in William Joseph Buckley (Editor), *Kosovo - Contending Voices on Balkan Intervention*, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans, 2000), pp. 159-169, p. 169

⁴⁴ "Balkans" Encyclopædia Britannica,

<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?query=balkans&eu=119643&tocid=42967>; accessed 01/28/02

The Balkan states are also part of what has been politically termed "Eastern Europe", which until the end of the Cold War signified a distinct region united by a common ideology, similar domestic political structures, and for most countries, a unified trading bloc and subservience to the Soviet Union.⁴⁵ After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union six months later, the way for independent political decisions for many of the East and Southeast European countries was open. For some of the successor states of Yugoslavia it led to war, for others the developments went peaceful. Neither did it lead to "cataclysmic periods in the Balkans" nor a new Balkan War.⁴⁶ Yugoslavia in 1991 was surrounded either by states which had been already embedded during the Cold War in the Alliance of Western States, economically like its border countries Italy, Austria and Greece in the European Union or militarily like Italy and Greece in NATO and WEU or by states which very soon found their way into Western integration either through associated memberships or an early perspective of full membership. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria became associated members of the Western European Union as early as 1992, Hungary became a NATO member in 1999, and all of these states, although with different timelines, are on their way into economic integration with the European Union. Even Albania, a communist state that during the Cold War had fiercely protected its sovereignty and in which almost all aspects of life were controlled by the ruling party, changed in

⁴⁵ Charles King, "The New Near East," *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 49-67, p. 50

⁴⁶ The First Balkan War was fought between the members of the Balkan League—Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro—and the Ottoman Empire. The Balkan League was formed under Russian auspices in the spring of 1912 to take Macedonia away from Turkey, which was already involved in a war with Italy. Under a peace treaty signed in London on May 30, 1913, the Ottoman Empire lost almost all of its remaining European territory, including all of Macedonia and Albania. Albanian independence was insisted upon by the European powers, and Macedonia was to be divided among the Balkan allies. The Second Balkan War began when Serbia, Greece, and Romania quarreled with Bulgaria over the division of their joint conquests in Macedonia. On June 1, 1913, Serbia and Greece formed an alliance against Bulgaria, and the war began on the night of June 29/30, 1913, when King Ferdinand of Bulgaria ordered his troops to attack Serbian and Greek forces in Macedonia. The Bulgarians were defeated and a peace treaty was signed between the combatants on Aug. 10, 1913. Under the terms of the treaty, Greece and Serbia divided up most of Macedonia between themselves, leaving Bulgaria with only a small part of the region. As a result of the Balkan Wars, Greece gained southern Macedonia as well as the island of Crete. Serbia gained the Kosovo region and extended into northern and central Macedonia. Albania was made an independent state under a German prince. "Balkan Wars" *Encyclopædia Britannica*;
<http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=12124&tocid=0&query=balkan%20wars>; accessed 01/29/02

1989 as well, but because of severe economic problems can not keep the pace with the other Western oriented states.⁴⁷ However, neither Albania nor any of the other so far mentioned states has itself actively engaged in former Yugoslavia, but instead tried to be involved only by helping those institutions and organizations which tried to settle the problems in the former Yugoslavia. War occurred in the secessionist states of Yugoslavia and did not involve other Balkan states like as in the last Balkan Wars in 1912-13.

But these same political motives, economic prosperity, foreign political security and desire for integration into Western economic and security organizations as soon as possible, which helped to stabilize to a larger extent the above mentioned countries and which helped for peaceful settlements in interstate conflicts, triggered the wars in Yugoslavia. Starting in 1979-81, the government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia began a decade-long struggle to resolve a foreign debt crisis and to restore liquidity and growth for its import-dependent economy, but as there was no way that such an economic reform could be kept separate from the political changes taking place in Europe by the mid-1980s. The strategic conditions under which socialist Yugoslavia once had built its national independence of both Cold War blocs while benefiting economi-

⁴⁷ In December 1990 the creation of independent political parties was endorsed, thus signaling an end to the communists' official monopoly of power. But continuing economic, social, and political instability led to the fall of several governments, and in March 1992 the first democratic leader of Albania, Sali Berisha, was elected. Albania's experiment with democratic reform and a free-market economy went disastrously awry in March 1997, when large numbers of its citizens invested in shady get-rich-quick pyramid schemes. When five of these schemes collapsed in the beginning of the year, robbing Albanians of an estimated \$1.2 billion in savings, their rage turned against the government, which appeared to have sanctioned the nationwide swindle. Rioting broke out and the country's fragile infrastructure collapsed, plunging the country into virtual anarchy. To help create a secure environment for international organizations in Albania and to facilitate the safe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, the UNSC authorized on 28 March 1997 a **Multinational Protection Force**, known as "**Operation Alba**". The Italian-led force had contingents from 11 countries -- Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Turkey. The multinational protection force, operating under Chapter VII of the Charter, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel, eventually restored order and set up the elections that formally ousted President Sali Berisha. It began operations on 15 April and completed its withdrawal from Albanian soil on 11 August. For Albania in 1997 compare Infoplease.com; <http://ad.doubleclick.net/646906/Scholarship4.html>; accessed 29/01/02 and "Albania" Encyclopædia Britannica; <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?query=albania&eu=119653&tocid=42656>; accessed 01/29/02; for the official UN report compare: UN, Press Release SC/6410 as of 14 August 1997

cally by balancing between two superpowers were rapidly unraveling and the new goal became European membership, and Slovene politicians led the way.⁴⁸

Collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

The formal collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, comprising the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Macedonia, began on 25 June 1991, when Slovenia and Croatia declared independence, followed by Macedonia on 19 December 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 1 March 1992.⁴⁹ The international recognition of the new states occurred step by step, with Germany taking the lead when it recognized Croatia and Slovenia on 23 December 1991, followed by the European Community (later European Union) on 23 January 1992.⁵⁰ Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized by the EC/EU on 7 April 1992, while formal recognition of Macedonia was delayed by Greece until 8 April 1993, due to Greek fears of irredentism.⁵¹ The United States recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia on 7 April

⁴⁸ Susan L. Woodward, "Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985-1991", p. 135-136

"When Tito died in 1980, a collective presidency, with one representative drawn from each republic, replaced him, a solution" which later should further foster the tenuous state of national identity. William J. Durch; James A. Schear, *Faultlines: UN Operations in the former Yugoslavia*, in William J. Durch (Editor), *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martins Press, 1996), pp. 193-274, p. 196

⁴⁹ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force - US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World*, (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2000), p. 129; International recognition of The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's (FYROM) independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 was mainly delayed by Greece's objection to the new state's use of what it considered a Hellenic name and symbols. This quarrel can be observed in any NATO Document whenever Macedonia is mentioned. Although the official name is Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey insists each time on issuing a footnote in the text, which declares, "Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name".

⁵⁰ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, p. 130; Germany often has been blamed for exacerbating the wars in the former Yugoslavia due to its early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. But so far Germany's reaction at this time has been promoted by its own recent experience of self-determination and its successful reunification one year earlier and the assumption was made that an early recognition would serve as a preventive measure against further conflict. (Ibid p. 131). Richard Holbrooke comes to a similar conclusion when states, "to blame Bonn alone for causing the war in Bosnia evades the responsibility of many others. Germany was scapegoated for what happened in Bosnia by people seeking to deflect attention from their own failures." Richard Holbrooke, *To end a War*, p. 32

For further details concerning this question compare: Steven L. Burg; Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina - Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*; (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 92-96

⁵¹ For a detailed discussion on Greek resistance concerning Macedonia's international recognition see: Mi-

1992 and the UN General Assembly accepted the three as full members on 22 May 1992.⁵² Already during these recognition procedures war broke out between Slovenia and Serbia, Croatia and Serbia and between all three ethnicities of Muslims, Croats and Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The reaction of the international community was inconsistent, driven by divergent opinions, often delayed and mainly paying tribute to the ongoing transformation process in the overall architecture of the European and transatlantic security organizations, whose "institutional capacity in the European and international order were not ready for the actions that were proposed."⁵³ In many ways the timing of the Yugoslav Crisis was an "orphan" of the Gulf War as well as the international preoccupation with developments in the former Soviet Union and in other parts of Eastern Europe.

During these early policy debates in major Western capitals and organizations, every international organization of substance, the European Union, the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATO was finally drawn into the Balkans in the 1990s and had its capabilities severely tested.⁵⁴ About whether and how to intervene in the several Yugoslavian conflicts to follow Susan L. Woodward identifies three competing explanations:

First, the *ancient ethnic hatreds school* that saw a pattern between Serbs and Croats and ethnic hatred characterizing the Balkans for centuries, which could no longer contained after Tito's death and since the Eastern European revolutions lifted the lid of communist repression from the region. A second historical school focused *nationalism* and the inevitability of nation-states in the modern world and that since the collapse of imposed communist regimes in Eastern Europe, countries could now resume their strivings for *national self-determination* as a natural continuation of goals begun in the nineteenth century. A third school focused on *nationalist (or predatory) leaders* whom they saw as stirring up violence and planning aggression to hold on to power and that these leaders would use any methods necessary to prevent their loss of power. Finally, in the face of violence and pressure for action, all three interpretations began to converge into one, that of *Serbian aggression*.⁵⁵

chael S. Lund, "Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992-1999: From Containment to Nation Building", in Bruce W. Jentleson (Editor), *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized*, pp. 173-208, pp. 179-180

⁵² Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, p. 131

⁵³ Susan L. Woodward, "Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985-1991," p. 145

⁵⁴ Carl Bildt, "Force and Diplomacy," p. 142

⁵⁵ Susan L. Woodward, "Costly Disinterest: Missed Opportunities for Preventive Diplomacy in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1985-1991," p. 138

Due to "faulty analysis, lack of national and collective interest, fundamental disagreements about whether to act, who should act, and how to act, mixed messages to the local parties, inappropriate instruments for the issues momentarily at stake in an evolving conflict, inexcusable delays between actions" contributed not only to a failure of prevention of hostilities but additionally exacerbated the tensions.⁵⁶ However, although in retrospective it seems to be easy to critique the decision-making processes and the "failures" in the Western capitals in the early 1990s and although many other – especially from the historic perspective when they occurred – developments in the world kept the attention away from this part of Europe, one should not forget that basically these Yugoslavian wars of succession were mainly "fed, shaped, manipulated, directed, and turned toward the purposes of (local) leaders and others whose interests were served by playing the ethnic card."⁵⁷ It was a competition to create wholly new nation-states, in which citizens and loyalties, strategic assets, and borders defined by the perceived right to national self-determination within the territory of a former state, contested as series of wars, "sometimes localized, sometimes rolling and interconnecting in which the projects of radical nationalists willing to use force to claim territorial sovereignty and the spontaneous behaviors of people facing this collapse interacted."⁵⁸ The horrors of ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo, were not a necessary corollary of nation-state building, they were a path chosen by governmental elites with concrete political goals in mind. The conscious choices of a Milosevic or Tudjman, backed by their political supporters in Serbia and Croatia, were even more critical to ethnic cleansing than the more abstract process of disintegration within the former Yugoslav state and the reconstitution of its national components into a multistate system.⁵⁹

⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 139

⁵⁷ Bruce W. Jentleson, "Preventive Diplomacy: Analytical Conclusions and Policy Lessons," in Bruce W. Jentleson (Editor), *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized*, pp.319-348, p. 322

⁵⁸ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 222

⁵⁹ Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred – Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 139; Warren Zimmermann, the last U.S. ambassador to

Taking into consideration the decisions of the political leaders of the different emerging states and parties on the one hand and the decisions made and actions taken by the international community on the other hand the dissolution of former Yugoslavia can be broken down in five phases which help to explain the timelines of why and how NATO became involved.

Phase 1 - Failed political international initiatives

The first phase of the conflict started with the declarations of independence of Slovenia and Croatia on 25 June 1991. The following ten-day war between the Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija; JNA) and Slovenian forces ended with the mediation of the European Community, giving the impression that the dissolution of a country was not so difficult after all.⁶⁰ In Croatia the conflict led to new levels of force. The already simmering differences between the Croatian government and Serbs in the Kraina since August 1990 spread in March 1991 to violent local confrontations among police, paramilitary groups and citizens in towns of ethnically mixed population in the Kraina and in Eastern Slavonia and led to a six-month war with the JNA with tens of thousands of dead, hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons and massive destruction of villages and towns in Croatia.⁶¹ Also in February and March 1992 first hostilities occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina as first signs of another emerging war. During this first phase of Yugoslavian wars, sanctions were one of the first diplomatic tools to be wielded, starting with an arms embargo and freeze on aid by the European Community and to be followed by several UN sanctions.⁶² The first phase ended with the cease-fire in January 1992 in Croatia, brokered by

Yugoslavia comes to the same conclusion: "In the beginning, nationalism was a top-down process – the ideology of vicious leaders manipulating the fears of people haunted by turbulent pasts.", Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 1996), p. 236

⁶⁰ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p. 146

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 146

⁶² Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, p. 135; "As typical in most sanction situations, a black market quickly appeared, and supplied the black-listed community with essential needs. Additionally, certain states, such as Greece and Russia, were accused of interfering with attempts at strengthening sanctions, and even of non-compliance, out of sympathy for fellow Orthodox Slavs (Serbs)." (ibid, p. 135) Although an early use of force from retrospective might have had a significant political effect in supporting

UN's envoy Cyrus Vance and the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, UNPROFFOR, on 21 February 1992.⁶³ As outlined earlier, at this time NATO's member states were not ready to accept an active military role of the Alliance but instead promoted the UN's approach of peacekeeping.

Phase 2 – UNPROFOR on the ground – NATO in the Air

The second phase started with the approval of the deployment of troops for UNPROFOR by the UN Security Council on 7 April 1992 and the stationing of its troops initially in Croatia, later in Bosnia as well. The initial force deployed 6.500 peacekeepers, which expanded to 38.000 by the end of 1994, and included troops from Britain, France, and seven other western countries.⁶⁴ During the three years between when the first peacekeeping troops of UNPROFOR entered Croatia and later Bosnia-Herzegovina and 21 November 1995 when the Bosnian Peace Agreement between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) was initialed in Dayton, Ohio (USA) NATO took several key decisions.⁶⁵ This led to operations by NATO naval forces, in conjunction with

diplomatic efforts during the early stages of this conflict, it has to take into consideration that as the Yugoslav conflicts moved quickly from Slovenia through Croatia and into Bosnia, international efforts were increasingly frustrated not only by the hard antagonisms of the local rivals, but also by the inability of the international community to agree on what it was trying to achieve in the region and this inability consequently made any discussion on the use of military force to back up diplomacy even more difficult. Carl Bildt, "Force and Diplomacy," p. 143

⁶³ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p. 146

⁶⁴ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, p. 136

⁶⁵ *NATO Handbook*, p. 113; some selected milestones are listed below:

July 1992: NATO ships belonging to the Alliance's Standing Naval Force Mediterranean, assisted by NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), began monitoring operations in the Adriatic in support of the UN arms embargo against all republics of the former Yugoslavia and sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). **October 1992:** Aircraft belonging to NATO's Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) began monitoring operations in support of UNSCR 781, which established a no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina.

April 1993: A NATO enforcement operation (Deny Flight) began on 12 April. Initially it involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft (later increased to more than 200) from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in the Adriatic. By December 1995, almost 100 000 sorties had been flown by fighter planes and supporting aircraft.

June 1993: A combined NATO/WEU concept of operations was approved for the enforcement of the UN arms embargo in the Adriatic. The resulting operation (Sharp Guard) included a single command and control arrangement under the authority of the Councils of both organizations. Operational control of the combined NATO/WEU Task Force was delegated, through SACEUR to COMNAVSOUTH in Naples.

the Western European Union, to monitor and subsequently enforce the UN embargo and sanctions in the Adriatic; and by NATO air forces, first to monitor and then to enforce the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Alliance also provided close air support to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and authorized air strikes to relieve the strangulation of Sarajevo and other threatened areas denominated by the UN as Safe Areas.

A Serbian mortar attack on a central market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994 marked the beginning of the end of phase two and brought NATO and especially the United States into a more active and in the end decisive role to end the conflict.⁶⁶ It took another 19 months to the final US-brokered agreement at Dayton in November 1995. During this time an ongoing humiliation by the Bosnian Serbs, backed by Milosevic, of UN sanctions and agreements took place, including constant violations of the Sarajevo Exclusion Zone, shelling of UN-designated safe areas, taking hostage of UN peacekeepers and conquer of UN-designated safe areas, starting with Srebrenica in July 1995 and murder of 7000 male Muslims by the Bosnian Serb forces. When the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina finally ended one of the biggest challenges was to learn and accept to live together again after a bitter and protracted war with at least 250.000 civilians killed and 200.000 wounded in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 2.8 million internally or displaced persons or refugees (60% of the pre-war population).⁶⁷ It was time to change the political agenda.

Besides the growing public disagreement about failed sanctions and an insufficient peace-keeping operation, increasing media coverage of the mounting atrocities, genocide, and ethnic cleansing in horrible detail, and an increasing refugee flow into neighboring European states fi-

During the enforcement operation approximately 74 000 ships were challenged by NATO and WEU forces, nearly 6 000 were inspected at sea and just over 1 400 were diverted and inspected in port. No ships were reported to have broken the embargo, though six attempted to do so and were stopped. With the termination of the UN arms embargo on 18 June 1996, Operation Sharp Guard was suspended.

28 February 1994, four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia and Herzegovina were shot down by NATO aircraft in the first military engagement ever to be undertaken by the Alliance.

⁶⁶ NATO issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to end the siege of Sarajevo by withdrawing all heavy weapons from the exclusion zone and in support of this move U.S. President Clinton cited four 'distinct interests: avoiding a broader European war, preserving NATO's credibility, stemming refugee flows, and a humanitarian stake in stopping the strangulation of Sarajevo and the slaughter of innocents in Bosnia'.

Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, p. 146

⁶⁷ Karin von Hippel, *Democracy by Force*, p. 165

nally led to a different approach and to the shift from merely European initiatives to an US-led solution and to the involvement of NATO.⁶⁸ The continuing atrocities committed by Bosnian Serb forces, and their avowed intent to ignore Security Council edicts, combined with Serb territorial losses to Croat-Muslim forces, in the end led a reconsideration of the strategy of UNPROFOR's major troop contributors and laid the groundwork for a more robust approach.⁶⁹ With NATO providing air strikes and deploying the Rapid Reaction Force into Bosnia, parts of UNPROFOR had finally metamorphosed from humanitarian intervention into peace enforcement.⁷⁰ With NATO's evolving role in supporting UNPROFOR and taking into consideration that maintaining the alliance was in its vital national interest, the United States had to recognize that European problems in the realm of security were American problems as well.⁷¹

In the summer and autumn of 1995 the political conditions in Europe, in former Yugoslavia especially and in the United States finally had changed. In May 1995 the new French president Jaques Chirac took office at the same day when photos were published of French peacekeepers being captured by Serb forces and being held as hostages, some of them tied to trees, some chained to Serb artillery pieces. Chirac no longer accepted the status quo on the ground and changed the until then slightly pro-Serbian French policy and took a harder line against Belgrade.⁷² The ongoing discussions about either to further strengthen UNPROFOR or to withdraw led finally to the French assessment that to keep the British in Bosnia, greater American involvement and support were essential.⁷³ In parallel NATO had already completed a Contingency Plan

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 138

⁶⁹ William J. Durch; James A. Schear, "Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia", in ed. William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, pp. 193-274, p. 252

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 252

⁷¹ Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, p. 398; The U.S. asserted its leadership by accepting NATO responsibility for a possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR and insisting that, because the United States would commit ground forces, command and control would shift from the UN secretary general and force commander to the United States. (Ibid, p. 398)

⁷² David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 293, 303

⁷³ Richard Holbrooke, *To end a War*, p. 65

that covered every aspect of the Alliance's role in supporting a U.N. withdrawal from Bosnia.⁷⁴ The NATO air missions already flown, the preparation of a support plan for the possible withdrawal of UNPROFOR, the shift in France's Bosnia policy and with it the European assessment that only NATO would be able to provide the necessary military power finally changed U.S. policy as well. If, in the event of a U.N. withdrawal, the U.S. would not deploy American troops, "the United States would be flouting, in its first test, the very NATO process it had created" which might have been seen as the end of NATO as an effective military alliance.⁷⁵ The events of Srebrenica in July 1995 and the market place shelling in August 1995 finally convinced the Clinton administration that Serbian force could only be stopped by NATO counterforce.⁷⁶

At the London conference on 21 July 1995 NATO's Foreign and Defense Ministers, with Russia participating, decided that NATO would draw "a line in the sand around the last remaining enclave of Gorazde and, even more important, that the decision as to whether or not use airpower, and how much, would be made by NATO only, thus removing the UN from its dreadful 'dual key' authority to Gorazde."⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Ibid, p. 66

⁷⁵ Ibid, p. 67

⁷⁶ Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe*, p. 231; "The crimes of Srebrenica finally pushed the West over the brink. (...) In Washington, the implications of the crisis in Bosnia were escalating rapidly. (...) Events in Bosnia added to the widening suspicion that this administration (Clinton) was facile and articulate and nimble... (...) The Balkans might become the tip of an iceberg of growing disappointment with an administration that had not yet found its way - nearly two and a half years after coming into office...", David Halberstam, *War in a Time of Peace*, p. 297

David Halberstam also offers a detailed view of General Shalikashvili's role during this time. General Shalikashvili as CJCS with his personal European background and his experiences as SACEUR took a different position than his predecessor General Powell. He was especially interested in fostering NATO's role as the decisive transatlantic alliance and political link. At the decisive meetings of the Alliance in The Hague and London in the summer of 1995 "... he again used the arguments about the future of NATO and the alliance. ... If NATO could not deal with this crisis, ..., if it failed here on European soil, ..., what was the purpose of the alliance." Finally, "for the first time there was an essential agreement on a new and more vigorous air campaign and a simplified, less politicized command structure. A great deal more muscle - so far potential muscle, but muscle nonetheless - had been added to the alliance's threats, and it had been more NATO-ized than UN-ized." (Ibid, p. 319-328)

⁷⁷ Richard Holbrooke, *To end a War*, p. 72; "Dual key was a system that required both the UN and NATO to 'turn the key' to authorize NATO air strikes. In practice, the 'dual key' was a 'dual veto', used by the UN to prevent or minimize NATO action." (ibid, footnote p. 72); For a more critical assessment of the results of the London Conference compare Steven L. Burg; Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999), p. 345

Phase 3 – NATO for the first time on the ground – IFOR/SFOR

Phase three started after the signing of the Bosnian Peace Agreement on 14 December 1995 in Paris when a NATO-led multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) was given the task of implementing the military aspects of the Peace Agreement. The Dayton agreement redefined the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a state - Bosnia and Herzegovina – composed of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Bosnian (Muslim-Croat) Federation) and the Republika Srpska (the (Bosnian) Serb Republic).⁷⁸ The deployment of some 60 000 IFOR troops on 16 December and the transfer of authority from the Commander of the UN Peace Forces to the Commander of IFOR took place on 20 December.⁷⁹ IFOR's primary military tasks were ensuring continued compliance with the cease-fire, ensuring the withdrawal of forces from the agreed ceasefire zone of separation back to their respective territories and ensuring the separation of forces, ensuring the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilization of remaining forces, creating conditions for the safe, orderly and speedy withdrawal of UN forces not transferred to the NATO-led IFOR and controlling the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁸⁰

In October 1996 the North Atlantic Council approved detailed political guidance for a study to be undertaken by the NATO Military Authorities of post-IFOR security options, and on the basis of a two-year consolidation plan established in Paris and elaborated in London under the auspices of the Peace Implementation Council established under the Peace Agreement and of the Alliance's own study of security options, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers concluded that a military presence is still needed to provide the stability necessary for consolidating the peace, although to be reduced in size. They agreed that NATO should organize a Stabilization Force (SFOR), which was subsequently activated on 20 December 1996, the day on which IFOR's

⁷⁸ Steven L. Burg; Paul S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina*, p. 367; Both the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska are not only recognized as distinct entity but even more granted the right to establish special parallel relationships with neighboring states. (Ibid, p. 367)

⁷⁹ *NATO Handbook*, p. 122

⁸⁰ *NATO Handbook*, p. 120-121

mandate expired.⁸¹ SFOR was authorized to implement the military aspects of the Peace Agreement as the legal successor to IFOR, operating under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement). Rules of engagement adopted for SFOR were the same as for IFOR, authorizing the robust use of force if it should be necessary for SFOR to accomplish its mission and to protect itself. SFOR's size, with around 31.000 troops in Bosnia, was about half that of IFOR. Subsequent assessments reduced force levels to around 20.000 by mid 2001. The primary task given to SFOR was to contribute to the secure environment necessary for the consolidation of peace and its specific tasks included deterring or preventing a resumption of hostilities or new threats to peace, consolidating IFOR's achievements and promoting a climate in which the peace process could continue to move forward and providing selective support to civilian organizations, within its capabilities.⁸²

At the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session held in Brussels on 18 December 2001 the civil and military progress in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was reviewed. The Defense Ministers decided that SFOR, building on its success to date, would continue to maintain a safe and secure environment in BiH and remain committed to supporting the work of international organizations in civil implementation, within means and capabilities. It was also decided, that no changes of SFOR's overall force levels and structure should be made at present. The NATO Military Authorities were directed to provide a force transition concept - including benchmarks - and present force structure options in the Spring of 2002 that will preclude a resumption of hostilities and contribute, within means and capabilities, to a secure environment through a lower presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁸³ Thus, phase three, which started in December 1995 with the change from UNPROFOR to IFOR, which one year later was succeeded

⁸¹ *NATO Handbook*, p. 123-124

⁸² SFOR' Role and Mandate, NATO Handbook, update on NATO website; available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb05010401.htm>; accessed 30/01/02

⁸³ Statement on the Situation in the Balkans, issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session held in Brussels on 18 December 2001, para 10 and 13, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-172e.htm>; accessed 30/01/02

by SFOR, is still not finished, the troops are in place today and the completion of the mission is still unsure.

Phase 4 - NATO and Kosovo (KFOR)

"Ignore the revisionists. Kosovo was a huge success. We won in 78 days, without casualties, without a legacy of bitterness or terror, and with all our objectives met. Every time I visit Kosovo, I meet people who would not be alive today but for NATO's planes and soldiers. You don't hear them bleating about 'war by committee'." ⁸⁴

Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, 31 January 2002

Phase four started when the conflict between Serbian military and police forces and Kosovar Albanian forces escalated in April 1999. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees estimated that the Serbian campaign of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo had created 226,000 refugees in Albania, 125,000 in Macedonia, and 33,000 in Montenegro. ⁸⁵ Diplomatic initiatives failed and to a certain degree some of the same procedures and failures occurred as eight years earlier, by either not being able or willing to solve the dilemma of undertaking preventive action before violence and extremism develop self-perpetuating momentum. ⁸⁶ Again policymakers did not focus on problems that were from their perspective not yet acute, "not to mention long-standing congressional skepticism about U.S. military involvement in the Balkans and the equally ambivalent views of other key countries such as Russia, Germany and Greece, it would have been quite difficult to prevent war." ⁸⁷ Finally NATO's Operation Allied Force with its seventy-eight days lasting air campaign achieved on 10 June 1999 the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of

⁸⁴ "NATO After September 11," Speech by Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, to the Pilgrims of the United States, New York, 31 January 2002, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020131a.htm>, accessed 02/01/02

⁸⁵ NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>; accessed 30/01/02; By the end of May 1999, over 230,000 refugees had arrived in Macedonia, over 430,000 in Albania and some 64,000 in Montenegro. Approximately 21,500 had reached Bosnia and over 61,000 had been evacuated to other countries and within Kosovo itself, 580,000 people were homeless.

⁸⁶ "Once again the threat of concerted international action came only after the conflict had turned deadly and was more a matter of conflict management than conflict prevention." Bruce W. Jentleson, "Preventive Diplomacy: Analytical Conclusions and Policy Lessons," p. 326

⁸⁷ Ivo H. Daalder; Michael E. O'Hanlon, *Winning Ugly - NATO's War to Save Kosovo*, (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 184-185

the principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis, including an immediate end to violence and a rapid withdrawal of its military, police and paramilitary forces. On 12 June 1999 as part of NATO's Operation Joint Guardian the first elements of the security force - KFOR - acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter were deployed.⁸⁸

KFOR's mission is to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order, to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the conditions of the Military Technical Agreement and the UCK Undertaking and to provide assistance to the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil functions until they are transferred to UNMIK.⁸⁹ At its full strength KFOR comprised some 50.000 personnel. In mid 2001, KFOR troops were reduced to about 42.500 troops, provided by all 19 NATO members and 20 non-NATO countries, including a Russian contingent of 3.200 men, under unified command and control.⁹⁰ A Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session held in Brussels on 18 December 2001, reviewed KFOR's overall force levels and structure. They concluded that the forces should be maintained with the exception of some further replacement of heavy war-fighting capabilities by units more appropriate for internal security operations. In conjunction with the decisions made for a further presence of SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Permanent Representatives were tasked to conduct a review of KFOR's roles and missions until Spring 2002 with the aim to achieve the greatest possible flexibility of forces and force rationalization, including through a review of KFOR's structures.⁹¹ Thus, like in phase three in Bosnia-Herzegovina, phase

⁸⁸ NATO's role in relation to the conflict in Kosovo, <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/history.htm>; Internet; accessed 30/01/02

⁸⁹ KFOR Objectives/Mission, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm>; accessed 30/01/02

⁹⁰ According to Oleg Letvin, who served from 1990-1999 on the Russian foreign ministry Balkan desk, Russia has suffered a fiasco in the Balkans and its influence and prestige among former Yugoslav republics and neighboring countries has fallen to the lowest point ever. Moscow managed neither to become a genuine partner to the West, nor to create an effective anti-Western outpost in Yugoslavia. He identifies three main reasons for "Russia's failures" in the Balkans: (1) Moscow's general weakness, (2) the inconsistency of its policies, (3) the uneven standards of Russian diplomacy: a striking lack of geopolitical perspective or policy planning. Oleg Letvin, "Inside Moscow's Kosovo Muddle," in *Survival*, vol. 42, no. 1, Spring 2000, pp. 130-140, p. 130

⁹¹ Statement on the Situation in the Balkans, issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Defense Ministers Session held in Brussels on 18 December 2001, para 9

four, which started in June 1999 with the deployment of KFOR into Kosovo, the troops are in place and an end of the mission is not in sight.

Phase 5 – NATO and Macedonia

Phase five started on 20 June 2001 when NATO responded positive to the request of President Trajkovski of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, to assist his government in demilitarizing the National Liberation Army (NLA) and disarming the ethnic Albanian extremists operating on the territory of Macedonia⁹² and decided to send troops with "strong and precise rules of engagement", to collect weapons from the ethnic Albanian extremists. The request came at a time when NATO, together with the European Union, were trying to encourage political dialogue between government authorities and the ethnic Albanian community and their agreement to a peace plan providing for the introduction of confidence-building measures such as an agreed multi-ethnic policing regime and guarantees that the political reform process will be implemented, e.g. the withdrawal of NLA fighters from the area, and the cessation of hostilities. Operation "Essential Harvest" was effectively started on 27 August. The 30-day mission involved the sending of 3500 NATO troops, with logistical support, to disarm ethnic Albanian groups and destroy their weapons.⁹³ So far NATO troops had already been stationed in Macedonia since 1998 when they did replace the UN peacekeeping mission which had originally been in January 1993 an extension of UNPROFOR and in March 1995 been renamed UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force), with the mandate to patrol the Macedonian side of the 240 kilo-

⁹² Some 1.95 million people live in Macedonia, of which according to the 1994 census, 22,7% are ethnic Albanians who live mainly in the west and in Skopje the capital. The census also recorded that 66,6% of the population were Macedonian Slavs, which are like the Serbs mostly Orthodox, while the Albanians are mostly Muslim. The conflict is mainly fuelled by Albanian claims that the census is incorrect and that they really number 40% of the population. They see themselves inadequately underrepresented in ministries and state institutions (3%). Tim Judah, "Greater Albania?", in *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 7-18, p. 12

⁹³ "Skopje requests NATO assistance"; <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0618/e0620a.htm>; accessed 01/30/02 and "Operation Essential Harvest (Task Force Harvest)" <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tfh/home.htm>; accesses 01/30/02

meter Serbian and 180-kilometer Albanian border, to monitor and report developments that could threaten Macedonia and to "deter by its presence such threats from any source, as well as to help prevent clashes which would otherwise occur between external elements and Macedonian forces, thus helping to strengthen security and confidence in Macedonia".⁹⁴ During and after the Kosovo war in 1999 Macedonia was part of the refugee help of NATO and until today is an important part of the rear area of KFOR.

Shortly after the conclusion of Operation Essential Harvest it was followed by Operation Amber Fox, which again was initiated on the request of President Trajkovski and started on 27 September 2001 with a three-month mandate, which has been extended a further three months until 26 March 2002. Operation Amber Fox has the mandate to contribute to the protection of international monitors from the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, who are overseeing the implementation of the peace plan in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The NATO operation consists of 700 troops from NATO member countries, which have reinforced some 300 troops already based in the country.⁹⁵ Like phase three and four this one is still in progress, thus adding to NATO's commitments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo a third mission in Macedonia.

Eleven years after the initial declarations of independence of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia NATO has troops stationed and missions ongoing in nearly all the secessionist new states, be it as peace enforcement missions as in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo or as preventive force commitment as in Macedonia or as troop deployments in the rear area or communication zone as in Croatia and Macedonia. During these eleven years ending violence in the region proved equally important for revitalizing and transforming NATO into the organization best enabled to

⁹⁴ Michael S. Lund, "Preventive Diplomacy for Macedonia, 1992-1999, p. 191; The military contingent of UNPREDEP was 1.050 persons strong at its height in 1996. Since spring 1993 500 U.S. troops had been added to the until this time mainly Canadian contingent. UNPREDEP's mission ended in 1998 when China vetoed the UN Security Council decision to renew the mandate as a reaction to Macedonia's recognition of Taiwan in response to Taiwanese economic aid. (ibid, p. 202)

⁹⁵ "Operation Amber Fox (Task Force Fox)", <http://www.nato.int/fyrom/tff/home.htm#f>; accessed 01/30/02

secure Europe's future as did the active and deliberate involvement of Russia in the diplomatic and peacekeeping aspects in the region proved important, both in mitigating possible negative effects of NATO's interventions in the Balkans and in shaping a new NATO-Russian relationship that, at a minimum, secured Moscow's acquiescence in NATO's enlargement.⁹⁶

After having described of how military engagement has changed from rather weak mandates to robust mandates based on improved political understanding and agreement on how to use force in the new post Cold War environment in Europe and before finally approaching the question of how to get forces out again after they have successfully been deployed, it is necessary to have a look at the political, diplomatic and economical involvements the military faces in these missions and if and how these relationships have changed during the above mentioned phases as well.

4. From Peace Enforcement to Peace Building

"Peace Building covers actions which support political, economic, social and military measures and structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of a conflict."⁹⁷

MC 327/1 (Final) "Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations"

Regional instabilities and overarching initiatives

In asserting the prospects of a lasting peaceful settlement of the conflicts in the successor states of former Yugoslavia, embedded in a wider Balkan and East European context, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. addresses five main sets of problems which have to be solved: "territorial and ethnic rivalries, weak or unable states and institutions, national isolationism, outside interference and international criminality."⁹⁸ As result of

⁹⁶ Ivo H. Daalder; James M. Goldgeier, "Putting Europe First," p. 85

⁹⁷ "This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures which tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction". MC 327/1 (Final) "Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations", para 7 f, p. 4

⁹⁸ Janusz Bugajski, "Southeast European Reconstruction: Winning or Losing the Balkans, in *Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Setting the Balkan Agenda, Washington D.C., May 31, 2001,*

the territorial ethnic rivalries and the intentional reshaping of the ethnic borderlines in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo this adds an additional subset of problems: refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).⁹⁹ According to the office of the United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees (UNHCR) the succession wars in former Yugoslavia ended in December 1995 with 1.1 million IDP's in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 200.000 in Croatia, and 187.000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Croatia, 650.000 in Serbia, and 656.000 in other European Countries with the main bulk of 345.000 in Germany.¹⁰⁰

As early as 1990 many different initiatives and projects have been started to solve the problems of the countries not only in the Balkans but incorporating their neighboring countries and regions as well. Nevertheless,

still until today they present a picture of an unconnected alphabet soup of American and European projects, programs, processes and partnerships, all designed to encourage good neighborly relations to prepare the way for entry into Euro-Atlantic institutions, but rarely has there been serious consideration of how these initiatives should fit together, or what the realistic strategic goals of regional cooperation should be.¹⁰¹

pp. 19-44, p. 19

⁹⁹ When a fleeing civilian crosses an international frontier, he or she becomes a *refugee* and as such receives international protection and help. If a person in similar circumstances is displaced within his or her home country and becomes *internally displaced person* then assistance and protection is much more problematic. UNHCR, "Who's an IDP?", available from

<http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home?page=PROTECT&id=3b84c7e23>; accessed 01/30/02

¹⁰⁰ Source: Map of "Main displaced populations from the former Yugoslavia, December 1995", *Humanitarian Issues Working Group, HIWG 96/6*, 11 December 1996; 616.000 in other European countries: Germany 345.000, Austria 80.000, Sweden 57.000, Switzerland 25.000, Netherlands 24.000, Denmark 20.000, France 15.000, United Kingdom 13.000, other: 37.000; A similar picture unfolded in mid-June 1999 in and around Kosovo when 63.000 IDPs went to Serbia and 70.000 IDPs to Montenegro, both groups mainly Serbs and 22.000 refugees of Albanian origin had fled to Bosnia-Herzegovina, 445.000 to Albania and 242.000 to Macedonia. Source: Map of Displaced populations from Kosovo in neighboring countries/territories, mid-June 1999, available from UNHCR website; <http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home>; accessed 01/24/02

¹⁰¹ Charles King, "The New Near East," p.49-50; One of his examples is the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), launched in 1992 and mainly driven by Turkey to promote itself as a powerful and equal partner to the EU by taking a more responsible and leading role in Eurasia is focused on a common policy in the Black Sea Area and consists of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and Greece. So far this organization promotes its own goals and has only an indirect influence on the states of former Yugoslavia. There main influence concerning economical build-up and political setting lays in the responsibility of numerous different individual reconstruction efforts and conflict resolution processes under the aegis of the UN, NATO, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the European Investment Bank. For more information compare the BESC Website: <http://www.bsec-organization.org>; accessed 11/08/01

Besides this critic two initiatives have proven reliable for approaching the political and especially the economic problems in the successor states of former Yugoslavia. First, the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)¹⁰², launched in 1996 with US support and later placed under the coordination of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)¹⁰³, and second, the Stability Pact for South-East Europe (Stability Pact), launched in 1999 by the EU and later placed under the auspices of the OSCE. The central objectives of both SECI and the Stability Pact are to encourage outside powers to engage in longer-term thinking about the future of the states in South-East Europe and to work at region-wide economic development rather than merely to react to the latest outbreak of violence.¹⁰⁴ On 10 June 1999, at the EU's initiative, the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe was adopted in Cologne to strengthen the countries of South Eastern Europe "in their efforts to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region" with a perspective of future Euro-Atlantic integration for the countries in the region. It was understood as an attempt to replace the previous, reactive crisis intervention policy in South Eastern Europe with a comprehensive, long-term conflict prevention strategy, an idea that arose in late 1998, and the NATO intervention in Kosovo undoubtedly acted as a catalyst in strengthening international political will for co-coordi-

¹⁰² The purpose of SECI is aimed to encourage cooperation among the countries of the region and facilitate the access of Southeast Europe to European integration and is a forum in which representatives of the participating states meeting to discuss common regional economic and environmental problems calling for concerted action and shall take into account region-wide plans for dealing with these problems. SECI shall not interfere with existing plans, projects, or initiatives, and shall interact with other initiatives for regional co-operation in southeastern Europe, including those launched by the European Union, by the Sofia Declaration on Good-Neighborly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in the Balkans, the Central European Initiative, and the Black Sea Economic Cooperation. It shall seek to complement them by providing for close cooperation among the governments of the region, emphasizing region-wide planning, identifying needed follow-up and missing links, providing for better involvement of the private sector in the regional economic and environmental effort, and helping create a regional climate that encourages the participation of the private sector. SECI shall authorize a High-Level Personality (HLP) to follow up on the decisions taken by the representatives of the participating states and to facilitate the implementation of projects. Purpose of SECI, Web page: http://www.unece.org/seci/seci_sop.htm; accessed 11/08/01

¹⁰³ UNECE was set up in 1947 by the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) and is one of five regional commissions of the United Nations. Its primary goal is to encourage greater economic cooperation among its member States and it focuses on economic analysis, environment and human settlements, statistics, sustainable energy, trade, industry and enterprise development, timber and transport. Source: <http://www.unece.org/oes/eceintro.htm>; accessed 01/30/02

¹⁰⁴ Charles King, "The New Near East," p.56-57

nated and preventive action in the region. The Stability Pact is based on the idea that conflict prevention and peace building can be successful only if they start in parallel in three key sectors: the creation of a secure environment, the promotion of sustainable democratic systems, and the promotion of economic and social well-being. Only if there is progress in all three sectors can a self-sustaining process of peace be achieved.¹⁰⁵ Neither SECI nor the Stability Pact are intended to become another regional organization as for example the BSEC, but the aim is rather to provide a broad coordinating mechanism for facilitating concrete regional development projects. The Stability Pact staged a series of international meetings designed to put pressure on Western governments to fund infrastructure projects and one of its main manifestations has been a series of periodic regional funding conferences organized jointly by the European Union and the World Bank, at which international organizations and national governments review project proposals and pledge financial status and so far the Stability Pact has provided what is most needed for rebuilding especially the successor states of Yugoslavia, a marketing tool, a charity fundraising drive and some kind of a blue-ribbon organizing board.¹⁰⁶ All these organizations focus on the political and economic settlement of the conflicts and each has its value and purpose, but for the people and their governments there are two other issues to be solved. In a short- and middle-term perspective they are looking for the prospect of just pure physical security, the perspective to be able to return and live without harm in their homes and cities, and secondly to have a more concrete perspective of living, working and "feeling" their return into Western community, something they "can grasp" instead of a nebulous "perspective of future Euro-Atlantic integration" as stated by the SECI or Stability Pact. For both these demands NATO has so far proved their best guarantor.

¹⁰⁵ Purpose and background of the Stability Pact are available from the its Website:
http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi/catalog/cat_descr.cgi?prod_id=1806; accessed 11/08/02

¹⁰⁶ Charles King, "The New Near East," p.57

NATO's role in the Balkans and beyond

"In practical terms, America's Allies are pulling their weight. In the Balkans more than 85% of the peacekeeping troops are European. The European Union is paying the lion's share in reconstruction and development. And in the coming months, we will see increasing efforts by the Europeans to reduce the burden on American shoulders in some of these Balkan operations."¹⁰⁷

Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, 31 January 2002

Based on its 1991 Strategic Concept NATO has developed on a broad range initiatives, agreements and working relationships with the states of the former Warsaw Pact as well as with all interested member states of the OSCE with the aim to foster security in the Euro-Atlantic area. A first step was the founding of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which met for the first time in December 1991 in Rome and which was established to bring together NATO Allies with former Warsaw Pact countries in a forum for security dialogue and cooperation. Three years later, the Partnership for Peace was launched to enable Partner countries to develop individual programs of practical cooperation with NATO as a complement to the opportunities for multilateral political dialogue afforded by the NACC. In 1997 the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council was created and by building on its achievements replaced the NACC. Aimed at promoting transparency and generating mutual confidence, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) brings together 27 Partners and 19 Allies for regular consultations on issues encompassing all aspects of security and all regions of the Euro-Atlantic area. EAPC ad hoc working groups focus on other areas of particular interest as for example regional cooperation in southeastern Europe and the Caucasus.¹⁰⁸ The EAPC brings together all the neighboring countries of former Yugoslavia, like Austria, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria as non-NATO states and Italy, Hungary

¹⁰⁷ "NATO After September 11", Speech by Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, to the Pilgrims of the United States, New York, 31 January 2002, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020131a.htm>, accessed 02/01/02

¹⁰⁸ NATO, Partnership and cooperation, Fact sheet, last update 01/10/02, available from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm>, accessed 02/02/02. The decision to create the EAPC, taken by Allied leaders meeting in Madrid in 1997, reflected a desire to move beyond the NACC and to build a security forum that matched the increasingly sophisticated relationships being developed with Partner countries under PfP and in the context of the NATO-led peacekeeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

and Greece as NATO members on the one side with the successor states Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia on the other side.

While the EAPC is a multilateral forum, it also serves as the political framework for the Partnership for Peace (PfP). The basic aims of PfP are to promote transparency in national defense planning and military budgeting and the democratic control of national armed forces, as well as to develop the capacity for joint action between forces from Partner countries and those of NATO member countries, for example, in peacekeeping or disaster-response operations.¹⁰⁹ Here again neighboring countries of former Yugoslavia and successor states are brought and tied together in an initiative which helps to provide security and to further strengthen the internal political confidence and economic prosperity.

Nevertheless, there is also some critique, calling "NATO a mini-United Nations" and that "seeking to direct this plethora of institutions from the headquarters of a military alliance (might) diffuse NATO's focus and confuse its priorities."¹¹⁰ On the other hand NATO's successful involvements in the states of former Yugoslavia and the active support of PfP partners and NACC/EAPC members like Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Macedonia during the settlement of the succession wars in former Yugoslavia, which allowed NATO forces the use of their airspace and the stationing of troops, proves that NATO's concept of dialogue and cooperation offers the essential difference to use force in an appropriate way where it is necessary. Or to use the words of NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson: "You can have all the fancy institutions in

¹⁰⁹ NATO, Partnership and cooperation, Fact sheet, last update 01/10/02, available from: <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2001/part-coop.htm>, accessed 02/02/02. Individual Partnership Programs are drawn up between NATO and Partner countries from an extensive menu of activities - the PfP Work Program - according to each country's specific interests and needs. The biennial program contains more than 2,000 activities, ranging from large military exercises down to small workshops. To help coordinate PfP training and exercises, a Partnership Coordination Cell was established at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). An International Coordination Center has also been set up at SHAPE to provide briefing and planning facilities for all non-NATO countries contributing troops to NATO-led peace-support operations in the Balkans.

¹¹⁰ This harsh critique was issued by Henry Kissinger in his book *"Does America need a Foreign Policy?"*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), p. 44; Without taking into consideration that NATO's decisive decisions are still made in the Council at 19, he calls "the annual summits of NATO's chiefs of state, now attended by nearly fifty leaders of the various groupings, including the nineteen formal allies, to be threatened to dissolve into a multilateral mishmash". Ibid, p. 44

the world, the most wonderful flow charts and wiring diagrams, but without proper capabilities, trained troops ready to go with the right equipment and the right back-up, you can't deal with a crisis; you can't send a wiring diagram to crisis."¹¹¹

Implementing the Dayton Peace Agreement in B-H

When SFOR succeeded IFOR at the end of 1996, the mission's aims became more ambitious. In addition to deterring a resumption of hostilities and promoting a climate in which the peace process could continue to move forward, they included providing an increased level of selective support, within SFOR's means and capabilities, to civilian organizations.¹¹² The current SFOR mission is related to the maintenance of a secure environment conducive to civil and political reconstruction. Preserving a secure environment remains SFOR's core mission, but as conditions within Bosnia did improve, SFOR has been able to assist civilian implementation of the peace agreement. The Peace Implementation Council - the body of countries and international organizations overseeing the Bosnian peace process - identified three strategic areas to take the peace process forward, namely deepening economic reform, accelerating refugee returns, and fostering functional and democratically accountable common institutions.¹¹³

¹¹¹ Quoted in (Ed.) Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, *European Security Institutions - Ready for the Twenty-First Century*, (Herndon, Virginia: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2000), p. 38. Even far beyond Yugoslavia NATO's concept of Cooperation and Dialogue as an addition to the core mission of Defense has proved worthful in these days, as NATO's SG pointed out in his speech in New York on 31 January 2002 in respect to NATO's role in the War against Terrorism: "And NATO's contribution stretches even further - because it has made a vital contribution to building the coalition that the United States needs to win this campaign. For years, NATO has been building partnerships and trust with Central Asian partners, including for example Uzbekistan. Now these same countries are providing airspace and bases without which effective operations in Afghanistan would have been impossible. Would that have been feasible without those years of cooperation with NATO? I doubt it.", "NATO After September 11", Speech by Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, to the Pilgrims of the United States, New York, 31 January 2002

¹¹² SFOR has a UN mandate not just to maintain peace in Bosnia, but also, where necessary, to enforce it. The current level of about 20,000 is significantly lower than the 32,000 deployed between December 1996 and November 1999, and only a third of the 60,000 deployed in the earlier Implementation Force (IFOR). NATO's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina: fact sheet, available from

<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm>, accessed 01/29/02

¹¹³ NATO's role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Fact Sheet, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/role-bih.htm>, accessed 01/29/02

SFOR in close cooperation with numerous other organizations and in close cooperation with the Office of the High Representatives (OHR), who is the final authority regarding the interpretation of the Peace Agreement on civilian implementation, monitors the implementation of the peace settlement, maintains close contact with the Parties to promote full compliance, co-ordinates the activities of the international organizations and agencies and provides guidance as appropriate to the IPTF (International Police Task Force). In the meanwhile SFOR is engaged in a broad field of activities which are far beyond the initial starting phase of IFOR seven years ago.¹¹⁴

Started in 1998 SFOR collects and destroys unregistered weapons and ordnance in private hands, in order to contribute to the overall safety of the citizens.

Although the apprehension of war criminals is a responsibility of the authorities in Bosnia, SFOR nevertheless provides security and logistic support to ICTY investigative teams as well as surveillance and ground patrolling of alleged mass gravesites.

SFOR forces are involved in the detention and transfer to The Hague of Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs) and since 1996 IFOR / SFOR has arrested 37 indicted persons.

SFOR provides security on request in support of law agencies and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) during the return and repossession process of more than 723,000 returns (368,000 refugees and 355,000 Displaced Persons).

By providing a secure environment on the cross Inter-Entity Boundary Lines (IEBL) roads and forcing the dismantlement of checks points, the SFOR role is instrumental in implementing freedom of movement throughout Bosnia.

SFOR is participating in the maintenance and repair of roads in collaboration with the local authorities and the international community.

SFOR continues to support civil development by implementing EU micro projects 2000 (i.e. not exceeding 300,000 DM) either by the MNDs or the respective CIMIC units.

SFOR's main responsibility concerning demining rests with the supervision of demining activities by the EAF, but retains a capacity to provide support on an as required basis for house clearance in support of the resettlement of returnees.

SFOR supports the OSCE in its mission to assist the Parties in the implementation of the Confidence and Security Building Agreement and the Sub-Regional Arms Control Agreement in order to limit the holding of heavy weapons by the Parties.

Crime and corruption remain the major threat to security in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as to the progress in civilian implementation of the Peace Agreement. SFOR Multinational Specialized Units (MSU) are an essential component of SFOR forces, providing unique capabilities in information gathering, crowd control, and liaison with the International Police Task Force and the local police.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ For further details regarding mission and responsibilities of the OHR compare William Wilczewski, "So what is OHR exactly?," First published in *SFOR Informer* No. 82, March 1, 2000, available from <http://www.nato.int/sfor/partners/ohr/t000302z.htm>, accessed 02/02/02

¹¹⁵ SFOR's mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina - Facts and figures, as of 03/26/01, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/bih-fnf.htm>, accessed 02/01/02; Since November 1995, 120,000 mines have been removed and 26 million square meters have been cleared. The former UNMAC estimated the

Restoring Peace in Kosovo

The main political responsibility lies with UNMIK in accordance with the UNSC resolution 1244. UNMIK is responsible to perform basic civilian administrative functions, promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status, coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies, support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, maintain civil law and order, promote human rights and assure the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo.¹¹⁶ To implement its mandate, UNMIK initially brought together four "pillars" under its leadership, (1) Police and Justice, under the direct leadership of the United Nations, (2) Civil Administration, under the direct leadership of the United Nations, (3) Democratization and Institution Building, led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and (4) Reconstruction and Economic Development, led by the European Union (EU).¹¹⁷

In accordance with UNSCR 1244, the mission of KFOR is threefold: to establish and maintain a secure environment in Kosovo, including public safety and order, to monitor, verify and when necessary, enforce compliance with the conditions of the Military Technical Agreement and the UCK Undertaking and to provide assistance to the United Nations Interim Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), including core civil functions until they are transferred to UNMIK.¹¹⁸ Until the UN Mission in Kosovo can fully assume its responsibility KFOR has the mandate to enforce law and order, a mission which was decisively different from IFOR's mission in 1995.¹¹⁹ In addition KFOR was actively involved in the demilitarization of Kosovo, especially the demilitarization

mine threat in Bosnia would not be removed until 2010.

¹¹⁶ UNMIK Web page, <http://www.un.org/peace/kosovo/pages/kosovo12.htm>, accessed 02/03/02

¹¹⁷ Ibid

¹¹⁸ NATO, KFOR Objectives/Mission, available from <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/objectives.htm>, accessed 02/01/02

¹¹⁹ Ibid; After just three months spent in Kosovo, KFOR troops had arrested hundreds of suspected criminals, confiscated quantities of weapons and ammunition, and restored the overall security and stability of the province. KFOR presence has allowed more than 775,000 refugees and displaced people to come back in Kosovo and feel secure again and a constant drop in the rate of murder, arson and looting was achieved.

and transformation of the Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which was completed on 20 September 1999.¹²⁰

Although KFOR's main responsibility was and still is to create a secure environment, it also provides resources, skills and manpower to various organizations and agencies working under the UNMIK umbrella such as public works and utilities, construction, transportation, railway operations, mine clearance, border security, fire services, protection of international workers, food distribution, removal of unexploded ordnance, mine-awareness education and medical services.

Peace Building – Who is in charge?

With NATO taking responsibility of peace support operations in the former states of Yugoslavia a change in doctrine and common understanding of these operations has successfully been developed. The core of these changes is the acceptance of the necessity of a robust mandate and discussions about peace keeping operations under a "six plus" or "six bravo" mandate of the United Nations as well as any discussions of "peace operations in gray areas" or "wider peace-keeping" should to be discussions of the past.¹²¹ However, what still needs to be explored and clarified in greater depth is the question of how to transcend from a successful peace enforcement operation to peace building. So far, it still is a challenge, how to effectively coordinate all the different agencies involved within the secure environment provided by the military force, and to enable the necessary political focal point, required for effective peace-building to coordinate the many different activities that building peace entails, a hybrid of political and development activi-

¹²⁰ Ibid; The KLA was disbanded and all KLA weapons were stored in secure weapons storage sites under the control of KFOR. The former KLA was successfully transformed into a Kosovo Protection Corps, an unarmed civil relief organization involved in the rebuilding of Kosovo's infrastructure.

¹²¹ Nevertheless, it keeps many writers busy as they develop even new approaches like "concepts of induced consent"; compare David Jablonsky; James S. McCallum, "Peace implementation and the concept of induced consent in peace operations," in *Parameters*, Vol. 29, Spring 1999, p. 54-70; Neither helpful seems to be the invention of the term "police keepers" in conjunction with military peace support operations as recently done by: LtCol (ret.) Timothy L. Thomas, "IT Requirements for Policekeeping", in *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXI, Sept.-Oct 2001, No. 5, pp. 29-35

ties targeted at the sources of conflict.¹²² The classical task of a neutral buffer between consenting parties has evolved into operations geared towards managing political, economic and social change, and as seen in the former Yugoslavia the operations of NATO are responses to intra-state, rather than interstate, conflicts.¹²³ The overall peace building approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Kosovo has changed the understanding of what constitutes the military's mandate and early perceptions of a "mission creep" has been overcome by the perception that there can be no military success in isolation.¹²⁴

But with it comes another challenge, unity of effort. Unity of effort recognizes the need for a coherent approach to a common objective between the various national military contingents and between the military and civilian components of a peace support operation. The main problem from a military perspective is, that "*coordination with civilian agencies can usually only be achieved by dialogue and consensus and not by command*", and therefore, "to achieve unity of effort at the strategic level requires close liaison between the supra-national and national political bodies and, at the tactical level, close and early liaison between the military and civilian components of the operation."¹²⁵ As logical as it appears the harder it is to achieve and it has been a long way from the experiences of UNPROFOR, "when many non-governmental organizations did not want to 'sully' their hands by working with the military, and today's acceptance that while military measures may be necessary to control violent conflicts, they have to support, be supplemented by and closely coordinated with civilian instruments, if a peace support operation is to be successful."¹²⁶ But to be truly successful this "calls for a significantly greater understanding be-

¹²² Compare Lakhdar Brahimi, "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," p. 8

¹²³ Espen Eide, "Peacekeeping past and present," p. 2

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 3; Kissinger's pessimistic assessment in 1994, that "the world community is willing enough to cooperate in 'peacekeeping' - that is, in policing an existing agreement not challenged by any of the parties - but has been skittish about 'peacemaking' - the suppression of actual challenges to world order", has finally been proven wrong. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p.809

¹²⁵ MC 327/1 Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations, para 11b, p. 8

¹²⁶ Espen Eide, "Peacekeeping past and present," p. 4; Concerning the role of UNPROFOR: "The coordination of political activity with the humanitarian and security elements of the mission in Bosnia was never properly achieved and made it more difficult for the UN to help to bring about peace." General Sir Michael Rose, *Fighting for Peace*, (London: The Harvill Press, 1998), p. 249

tween the various military, civil, humanitarian and development organizations, understanding of each others' cultures, policies, procedures, decision-making processes, resource bases, capabilities, strengths and limitations."¹²⁷ The final coordination between the civil authorities in place and the responsible military commanders relies on both sides on confidence and understanding of each other's missions and responsibilities. It is without doubt the greatest challenge all SFOR and KFOR commanders have faced so far.¹²⁸

5. Past Theory in a new strategic environment

"Lastly, even the ultimate outcome of a war is not always to be regarded as final. The defeated state often considers the outcome merely as a transitory evil, for which a remedy may still be found in political conditions at some later date."¹²⁹

Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, 1832

The Clausewitzian System in a post-conflict scenario

Carl von Clausewitz¹³⁰ describes war in general as a total phenomenon whose dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical trinity composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind nature force (mainly the people), of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam (the commander and his army);

¹²⁷ David Lindburn, "Lessons learned," p. 3; This addresses especially the civilian side, when he further on points out, "need for cooperation, hence fundamental understanding, between those responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment."

¹²⁸ General Dr. Klaus Reinhardt, *KFOR – Streitkräfte für den Frieden*, (Frankfurt/M.: Verlag der Universitätsbuchhandlung Blazek und Bergmann, 2001), pp. 573 (COMKFOR 8 October 1999 – 18 April 2000)

¹²⁹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 80 (Original: *Vom Kriege*, Berlin 1832)

¹³⁰ Carl Phillip Gottlieb von Clausewitz (1780-1831) was a Prussian soldier and intellectual. He served as a practical field soldier (with extensive combat experience against the armies of the French Revolution and Napoleon), as a staff officer with political/military responsibilities at the very center of the Prussian state, and as a prominent military educator. Clausewitz first entered combat as a cadet at the age of 13, rose to the rank of Major General at 38. His book, *On War* (*Vom Kriege*) has been translated into virtually every major language.

and of its element of subordination, as an instrument to reason alone (the government).¹³¹ These three tendencies, which Clausewitz describes as different codes of law, need to be kept in balance.¹³² Although Clausewitz invented the described model of paradoxical trinity to describe the characteristics of war it can also be used as a broader concept to define and describe the relationship between the people, the armed forces and the government in general. The challenge in interstate conflicts, but also in intra-state conflicts, is to bring the trinities of all parties involved into relationship to each other, since no conflict can be defined in isolation by one party alone because it is shaped by the dynamic interaction among all involved parties' individual trinities.¹³³ To achieve a stable situation in post conflict situations as for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo Clausewitz's model can help to assess the situation between the three tendencies and to develop a common understanding of what has to be achieved to establish a stable and well balanced end state.

Another element which helps to describe and to focus all efforts to achieve ones own goals is Clausewitz's term of center of gravity, which he describes as "the hub of all power and movement on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed."¹³⁴ Clausewitz does not use the term center of gravity in a purely military sense but clearly states that it could not only be an army but for instance a capital, the community of interests in an alliance or in popular uprisings the personalities of the leaders and public opinion.¹³⁵ Defining

¹³¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 89

¹³² Ibid, p. 89

¹³³ Michael I. Handel, *Masters of War - Classical Strategic Thought*, Third Edition (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), p. 106

¹³⁴ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 595

¹³⁵ Ibid, p. 596; The term Center of Gravity is used in a more narrow sense in U.S. doctrines, e.g. JP 1-02: "Centers of gravity — Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight." (*Joint Publication 1-02*, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001) Nevertheless, Joint Publications as well as Army doctrines give examples for centers of gravity which are beyond pure military definitions: "National will can also be a center of gravity, as it was for the US during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars." (*Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia*, 16 July 1997, p. 86); "During the Gulf War, for example, US Central Command identified the coalition itself as the friendly center of gravity." (*Field Manual No. 3-0*, Operations, HQ Department of the Army, Washington DC, 14 June 2001, para 5-27); In retrospective of NATO's air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 General Clark stated that "yet the most subtle and diffi-

strategic centers of gravity in post conflict scenarios will help to focus on the necessary means and requirements to be provided to achieve the desired end state.

Finally decisive points have to be identified, as they are the key either to foster or to weaken a center of gravity. In accordance with the broader use of the term center of gravity in post conflict scenarios as described above they can be defined as specific key events, critical systems, or functions that allow to successfully implement a center of gravity.¹³⁶

Desired End States, Centers of Gravity and Decisive Points

"The aggressive nationalism that destroyed Yugoslavia and turned Bosnia into a killing ground can be overcome only by a recommitment to the proposition that different ethnic groups must learn to live together."¹³⁷

Warren Zimmermann, last U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia, 1996

Both military NATO missions, SFOR as well as KFOR, work in close cooperation with the political superiorities, UNMIBH in Bosnia and Herzegovina and UNMIK in Kosovo, and both assist in numerous supporting roles, either because free capacities became available over time like in SFOR's area of responsibility or had to be provided already at the beginning of the operation because no one else was in place or able to do as in KFOR's case. But the question arises when these additional tasks can be reduced to a minimum and thus provide the possibility to either further reduce the size of SFOR and KFOR troops or even better provide the possibility to withdraw them from the Balkans.¹³⁸ So far SFOR, KFOR and NATO troops in Macedonia as well, are needed to provide an environment which allows on the one hand for the people in these countries

cult lesson of the air campaign is that it always had a political rather than a military center of gravity. It was the cohesion of NATO that finally pressured President Slobodan Milosevic into accepting the alliance's conditions." General Wesley K. Clark, "The Strength of an Alliance," in Ed. By William Joseph Buckley, *Kosovo - Contending Voices on Balkan Interventions*, pp. 253-255, p. 253

¹³⁶ "A geographic place, specific key event, critical system, or function that allows commanders to gain a marked advantage over an enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an attack."; *Joint Publication 3-0*, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001; "Decisive points are the keys to getting at the CoGs."; NATO Bi-SC Document, *Guidelines for Operational Planning*, Draft as of 1 December 1999, para 3-5

¹³⁷ Warren Zimmermann, *Origins of a Catastrophe*, p. XII

¹³⁸ The NATO mission in Macedonia is part of KFOR.

to return to their homes, live in peace without fearing to be involved in ethnic hatreds again and on the other hand to provide an overall secure environment which allows for restoring the region politically and economically.¹³⁹

For the region as a whole, region in this case defined as the Balkans, the desired end state can be defined as follows:

A stable region aimed at economic integration and security cooperation with sovereign states who guarantee sovereign political decisions of democratically elected governments, based on respect of human rights, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and which refrain from using force against other states and from using violence against their own people or ethnic minorities.¹⁴⁰

Taking all the developments and engagements of the international community of the past ten years into consideration one can state that Slovenia and Croatia as two of the successor states of former Yugoslavia are settled and are already part of the Euro-Atlantic Community. Their governments are accepted and the steps they take are in conformity with internationally agreed "rules of political behavior". They are promoting the desired end state. Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Moldova are all states which still face severe economic problems, but overall, like Slovenia and Croatia they have any disputes so far arising with neighbor states settled in a peaceful way and especially without using forces outside their counties. Even more, they have provided decisive support for NATO to settle the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Their governments, which – with the exception of Albania in 1997 – did not force any international organization to intervene inter-

¹³⁹ By taking the positive political developments in Slovenia, Macedonia and Croatia over the last two years into consideration Kissinger's assessment of all of the successor states of Yugoslavia as "obsessed by historic grievances and age-old quests for identity, they strive primarily to prevail in ancient ethnic rivalries" seems to be too negative as well as his statement: "The goal of international order is beyond their fields of interest and frequently beyond their imaginations.", Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 807

¹⁴⁰ Compare the Washington Summit Communiqué, para21: "Our (= NATO) goal is to see the integration of the countries in the region into the Euro-Atlantic community. We want all the countries and peoples of South-Eastern Europe to enjoy peace and security and establish normal relations with one another, based on respect of human rights, democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law."; for the definition of "Balkan" compare chapter 3: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova

nally, have settled internal disputes.¹⁴¹ They are promoting the desired end state as well. Macedonia so far is the only country which needs external help to provide internal security. However, it has always been on request of the elected government and thus can be viewed as an example of "invited" preventive use of force. Like the aforementioned states, Macedonia has always provided support for NATO's operations in the successor wars of former Yugoslavia and is integrated in the Euro-Atlantic Community.

Finally we face three areas of problems, which so far seem to be the decisive hurdles to overcome and to reach the desired end state. First, Bosnia and Herzegovina with its two parts, the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republica Srpska, a state which has been founded as a compromise at the Dayton Peace Accord and which until today keeps SFOR troops in place, second, Kosovo, which still is under international law a province of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and which at the moment has the status of a NATO protectorate and which keeps KFOR troops engaged, and third, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia itself with its two remaining provinces Serbia and Montenegro. To achieve the desired end state the main focus in these three cases lays within overall political decisions in all the two states and in the province itself. This means, that the three ethnicities in Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to find a true common understanding to solve and reverse the ethnic cleansing and to fully and unbiased have to accept their state, that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will have to find a political settlement which allows democratic reforms to develop and to overcome the legacy of Milosevic, and that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and their province Kosovo will have to find a for both sides acceptable political agreement, which allows for both ethnicities involved in this case to live peacefully together again with respect of the different ethnicities.¹⁴² By using Clausewitz's definition of Center of Gravity,

¹⁴¹ And in the case of Albania it was the government itself, which asked for external help.

¹⁴² One of the main problems is that "the states and parastates that have been formed as a consequence of the breakup of Yugoslavia seek social cohesion and political stability through ethnic homogenization. The policies of ethnic cleansing during the war have been continued in the peace and national exclusivism dominates political programs almost everywhere in the region." Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred*, p. 183; Compare also David Fromkin, *Kosovo Crossing* (New York: Simon & Schuster 1999), p. 157: "... but

"the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends", which is the point "against which all our energies should be directed", there are three very similar but nevertheless very independent Centers of Gravity to identify.

In all three cases it boils down to the will of the people to accept a peaceful settlement and to accept and trust their governments. Thus, the governments are the Centers of Gravity, they are the hub of all power and movement, which will either result in stable conditions of their states or if they fail, in the reverse case be the hub from which again dissolution and instability will inevitably be initiated.

The challenge for Bosnia and Herzegovina is to form a lasting government which allows equal representation of its two parts, the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republica Srpska, still until today separated by the Inter Entity Border Line (IEBL), and to be truly representative for all three ethnicities, which until today are not in all cases allowed to live again at the places they lived ten years ago and finally to be able to achieve acceptance for their state especially in those parts where Croats and Serbs are thinking about secession and possible unification with Croatia on the one side and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the other side. To overcome this challenge several decisive points have to be met, respectively being realized:

- A secure environment, which relies for any possible threats from the outside on common Entity Armed Forces (EAF) and for internal security on a multi-ethnic non-biased police force.
- Secure return of refugees and IDP's to their homes if they wish and if they don't wish an accepted program for an exchange of houses and properties between ethnicities.
- A working and reliable infrastructure which supports equally all parts of the state and which is the necessary prerequisite for a stable economy.
- A stable economy which relies on investments in the country and which will over a longer period of time allow to regain an acceptable gross national product.

the 1995 accords, negotiated at Dayton, Ohio, under American auspices, in practice partitioned that state (Bosnia and Herzegovina) along ethnic lines; the unitary state is a technicality rather than a reality."

The challenge for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is to form a government which is able to unite and represent all people in this remaining part of former Yugoslavia, aimed at reestablishing law and justice with the goal to find a peaceful solution to either successfully reintegrate its province Kosovo or to achieve an acceptable solution for the self determination of Kosovo without jeopardizing that Montenegro might be the next one to follow in the long line of secessionist states. The decisive points to be met are:

- A stable government based on democracy and justice, which allows for proper representation of all minorities and which refrains from further interferences into the politics of its neighboring states, especially its secessionist successor states.
- Establishing full and unquestioned control of all the executive forces, be it the military, state police or any other remnants of Milosevic's former political power.
- Rebuilding of the economy to provide a lasting perspective for its population.

The challenge for the province Kosovo is to form an interim government, which paves the way to a peaceful return into the federation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The decisive points to be met are:

- A secure environment, based on justice and law which allows the unhindered return of Albanians as well as Serbs to their homes and where not achievable by both sides accepted procedures for an exchange of houses and properties.
- Disarmament of the UCK, unhindered political control of its remnants and the build-up of a multi-ethnic unbiased police force which will guarantee law and order.
- Rebuilding of the economy and a reliable infrastructure.

To support the desired overall end state and to successfully promote the above-defined specific Centers of Gravity and the derived Decisive Points of the three states/province, NATO's responsibility is two folded. It is on the one hand the political role, represented in its numerous political initiatives concerning these three problem areas and it is on the other hand the military involvement of its peace enforcement troops "on the ground". Or to express it in a different way, NATO in this case is the so far most able and most reliable (and by the way most successful) "en-

abler" of a secure environment.¹⁴³ The question to be answered after nearly seven years of engagement is, how to shift or transfer the military burden to the political side.

6. Shifting responsibilities

"Today the United States and NATO are committed to keeping troops in Bosnia and Kosovo until either they become multiethnic democracies or time comes to an end. Old Balkan hands ... tell me that the end of time is the more likely event."¹⁴⁴

Alexander M. Haig, Jr., former U.S. Secretary of State and Supreme Allied Commander of NATO forces in Europe, 2001

Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood?¹⁴⁵

NATO's missions in the successor states of former Yugoslavia proved that its core institutional features, the political structure for consultation and decision-making and the integrated military command structure, were assets, which made it unique compared with other organizations. Only NATO as a political-military alliance has – so far – the headquarters with planning, logistics, and intelligence staffs, including military personnel who have all planned, trained, exercised, and schooled together for years and developed understanding of each others capabilities to provide for a common policy the military instruments for fast mobilization, organization and implementation.¹⁴⁶ Nevertheless, during the whole transformation process of NATO in the early 1990s and its growing involvement in the conflicts and wars in former Yugoslavia the term "mission creep" coined the other side of the debate. In the operations order for Operation Joint Endeavor (IFOR) it has been explicitly stated that a "mission creep is to resisted."¹⁴⁷ The intention

¹⁴³ Compare Espen Eide, "Peacekeeping past and present," p. 3, "Indeed, in only a few years, NATO has transformed itself to take on an almost entirely new role and became an increasingly effective instrument for military and political crisis management."

¹⁴⁴ Alexander M. Haig, Jr., "Humanitarian Intervention – Introduction" in *Orbis*, Volume 45, No. 4, Fall 2001, pp. 495-501, p. 499

¹⁴⁵ The subtitle refers to an article of Adam B. Siegel, "Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood," in *Joint Forces Quarterly*, Summer 2000, pp. 112-115

¹⁴⁶ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," p. 725/726

¹⁴⁷ Adam B. Siegel, "Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood," p. 112

was to keep civilian and military missions strictly separated and to avoid any commitment of military forces to tasks and missions, which over a longer period of time would either degrade unique military capabilities or hinder military decision making processes.¹⁴⁸ As already described IFOR/SFOR and KFOR nevertheless expanded their missions or better to say changed their missions.

As well as operations in war will lead to new assessments and adaptations over time so do peace support operations. The key to understand and to accept changes is to ensure the consistency of military activities on the ground with political objectives.¹⁴⁹ Four different categories of mission changes can occur:

Task accretion is the accumulation of added tasks viewed as necessary to achieve initial mission objectives. These changes generally occur on the ground, as the leader on the spot believes necessary.

Mission shift occurs when forces adopt tasks not initially included that, in turn, lead to mission expansion. There is a disconnect between on-the-scene decisions to involve forces in additional tasks and decision making processes.

Mission transition comes about when a mission undergoes an unclear or unstated shift of objectives. This occurs at higher headquarters and in political sectors in an environment of gradual and perhaps unclear or unrecognized modification. The changes may neither be explicitly stated nor lead to reevaluation of forces involved and assigned tasks.

Mission leap occurs when missions are radically changed and thus alter military tasks. These are explicit choices, whether or not political or military leaders recognize their implications.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ The written discussions about "mission creep" are numerous, although mainly a U.S. driven topic. Compare e.g. James Warren, "Small wars and military culture," in *Society*, New Brunswick, Sep/Oct 1999, Vol. 36, Issue 6, (available from <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb>; accessed 08/27/01), p. 1-7: "... an enduring skepticism about recent American decision-makers' ability to discern where, when and how to use military force effectively. Deeply worried about 'mission creep' and the pursuit of lofty generalities such as 'the expansion of democracy and freedom' in places with long histories of intractable ethnic and religious conflict, they recoil from the deployment of ground forces far more than they do the use of air or sea-launched cruise missiles." (Ibid, p. 5); Concerning General Shalikashvili's role in changing these assessments compare the article of Lyle J. Goldstein, "General John Shalikashvili and the civil-military relations of peace-keeping," in *Armed Forces and Society*, New Brunswick, Spring 2000, Vol. 26, Issue 3, pp. 387-411 (available from <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb>; accessed 08/27/01); A summary of the pros and cons concerning U.S. involvement in peace support operations and its influence on the discussion in the U.S. military is provided by: Sam C. Sarkesian, "Humanitarian Intervention - The Price Paid by the Military" in *Orbis*, Volume 45, No. 4, Fall 2001, pp. 557-568

¹⁴⁹ Adam B. Siegel, "Mission Creep or Mission Misunderstood," p. 115

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 113-114; "Task accretion and mission shift refer to bottom-up situations where on-the-ground factors drive change. Mission transition and mission leap are top-down; decisions taken away from the scene lead to some form of mission change." (Ibid, p. 114)

During their missions in former Yugoslavia NATO troops went through several of these different mission changes. Although it wasn't a mission leap which changed radically the original military task, nevertheless SFOR's mission leaped from establishing a secure environment to a larger involvement of providing assistance to civil organizations than it was foreseen in Annex 1A of the Dayton agreement. Task accretion happened right from the beginning of KFOR's mission when no one else was there to enable and enforce law and order and provide the first essential help for the returning refugees.¹⁵¹ Mission shifts occur on a daily basis in SFOR's Multinational Divisions sectors and KFOR's Multinational Brigade sectors when nationally driven civil-military projects involve troops in providing help for the population in their areas of responsibilities.¹⁵²

There has been no mission creep in NATO's missions in former Yugoslavia but there have been several mission changes, which ranged from task accretion and mission shift to mission

¹⁵¹ As of 2000 "KFOR soldiers and the international community have cleared over 16.000 homes, 1.165 schools and almost 2.000 kilometers of roads of unexploded ordinance and mines. They have distributed over one million roofing tiles, 18.000 stoves and 4.000 truckloads of firewood to Kosovar homes and villages. Over 43.000 Kosovars have received medical treatment in KFOR medical facilities. Power stations, roads, bridges and railroads have been repaired by KFOR engineers." (Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Secretary General NATO, *Kosovo one Year on*, published by NATO HQ Brussels 2000, p. 17);

The importance of these first responses has been stressed besides several others by LtCol Joseph Anderson during his personal participation in KFOR's initial deployment in 1999 when he underlines the importance "of winning the hearts and minds of the people" in *ibid*, "Military Operational Measures of Effectiveness for Peacekeeping Operations," in *Military Review*, Vol. LXXXI, Sept.-Oct 2001, No. 5, pp. 36-44, p. 38

¹⁵² The best example of the many different involvements of NATO troops in Humanitarian Aid, CIMIC projects, Engineering and Restructuring processes is provided by NATO's web pages of SFOR and KFOR: <http://www.nato.int/sfor/index.htm>; <http://www.nato.int/kfor/index.html>; accessed 02/11/02;

Asked, what lessons he draws from his experience of the Bosnia and Kosovo missions and how civil-military relations can best be coordinated, General Sir Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, comes to a similar conclusion: „We use soldiers, particularly engineers, to carry out reconstruction tasks. Some of these tasks are appropriate for the military to do. For example, with the possible exception of one or two non-governmental organizations, we probably have the greatest expertise in areas such as mine clearance. That said using military engineers to build schools is probably valid in the early stages of an operation. But, *once matters have progressed, such reconstruction is taking the possibility of generating work away from the local population and is no way to build a new society.* Some senior engineers may be needed to supervise local construction work to start with but, even then, they should not stay for long because their presence would be stopping the evolution of a society. Coordinating such work with the civil agencies charged with reconstruction requires some form of central civil administration, whether it's the local government or some imposed administration such as is the case with the United Nations in Kosovo, and then it should be clear who is supporting whom in each particular case." Interview with General Sir Rupert Smith: DSACEUR, in *NATO Review*, Web edition, Vol. 49 - No. 2, Summer 2001, p. 24-25, available from <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0102-06.htm>, accessed 08/28/01

leap. There was no misunderstanding of the mission, but rather a growing sense or humanitarian desire of 'to do something if we are already here and progress seems to develop so slowly'. The challenge is to shift back some of the above mentioned mission changes and to focus on an appropriate force level, to streamline functions and command and control relationships without jeopardizing the core mission of providing a secure environment for the lasting political challenges to build or rebuild stabile states.

State building

"The Parties shall conduct their relations in accordance with the principles set forth in the United Nations Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act and other documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In particular, the Parties shall fully respect the sovereign equality of one another, shall settle disputes by peaceful means, and shall refrain from any action, by threat or use of force or otherwise, against the territorial integrity or political independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina or any other State."¹⁵³

Art. I, General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1999

Without doubt, seven years of international intervention in Bosnia have brought substantial progress since peace is more or less taken for granted, and the international community has paid for a massive reconstruction of much of the country's destroyed infrastructure. But at deeper levels, progress has been slower and the High Representative – initially appointed to oversee the civilian implementation of the Dayton peace agreement – now makes more and more critical decisions for Bosnia as the international community takes one step after another to reinforce its role in running the country.¹⁵⁴ Today the international community regulates Bosnian life down to the provision of local community services, employment practices, and school admissions. Although multiethnic administrations are in place, the consensus attained is imposed and compliance with international edicts is accompanied by the threat of dismissals or economic sanctions for non-

¹⁵³ Text of the General Framework Agreement initialed in Paris, France, 1999, available from <http://www.nato.int/for/gfa/gfa-fm.htm>; accessed 01/23/02

¹⁵⁴ Carl Bildt, "A Second Chance in the Balkans, p. 152

compliance, which does not encourage the emergence of a negotiated accountable solution that could be viable in the long term.¹⁵⁵ "The institutions of the Bosnian government are hollow structures, incapable of operating autonomously – not because of Bosnian incapacity but because of the imbalance of power between Bosnian and international policymakers."¹⁵⁶ The challenge of state building in Bosnia is to find solutions, which will lead to self-government and to establish institutions that can secure the rule of law by taking into consideration the interests of all three ethnicities. Instead of intensifying and institutionalizing the still existing ethnic and regional divisions by further on relying on some sort of "protectorate powers" it will be necessary to allow people in Bosnia and Herzegovina greater autonomy to develop their own solutions.¹⁵⁷ Maybe the challenging goal of constructing a liberal, democratic and multicultural political system in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been too far fetched. The political decision makers have to consider, if there really is a chance of having a liberal-democratic and multicultural-pluralistic Bosnia and Herzegovina without external political and economic pressure and lasting external military presence in place.¹⁵⁸ Critics have viewed the Dayton peace agreement as a successful cease-fire agreement and warned that it would be impossible for a multiethnic state to survive in Bosnia. So far war – because of SFOR's presence and the numerous political engagements – has not broken out again, but maybe one solution to be considered in a foreseeable timeframe should be political decisions by the people themselves comparable to the peaceful decisions made in former Czechoslovakia in 1992.¹⁵⁹

UN Resolution 1244 virtually suspended Yugoslavia's sovereignty over Kosovo and UNMIK Regulation No. 1999/1 of 25 July 1999 'On the Authority of the Interim Administration in Kos-

¹⁵⁵ David Chandler, "Bosnia: The Democracy Paradox," in *Current History*, March 2001, Vol. 100, No. 644, pp. 114-119, p. 118

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 118

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 119

¹⁵⁸ James Kurth, "Humanitarian Intervention – Lessons from the Past Decade," in *Orbis*, Volume 45, No. 4, Fall 2001, pp. 569-578, p. 576

¹⁵⁹ Compare Richard Holbrooke, *To end a War*, p.363-366, who already in 1998 sums up flaws and failures of the agreement, but also clearly states that in 1995 the main interest was to stop the fighting and not so much to define a road map for a successful state. So the "cease-fire" was the main goal and not so much the "desired end state" of a prosperous and peaceful Bosnia-Herzegovina.

ovo' stipulated that 'all legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)'.¹⁶⁰ In 1999 the political, economic, social and administrative structures of Kosovo were nearly destroyed and with the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces and authorities the majority of Serb expertise and leadership that had virtually monopolized the administration over the last ten years had left as well.¹⁶¹ One of the main problems for UNMIK during the first months was to overcome the paralysation of the judiciary because of the controversy over what law would be applicable and to change the unwillingness of local judges, prosecutors and the population at large – whether Albanian or Serb – to cooperate in the area of criminal justice. Finally in February 2000 international judges and prosecutors were appointed.¹⁶² Still until today and although some progress has been achieved, the stability in Kosovo mainly relies not only on the military presence of KFOR but as well on externally decided and implemented legitimate and efficient state structures.¹⁶³

In Kosovo the question at stake is whether the definite separation from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and its establishment as an independent state should be promoted or not. Since the beginning of UNMIK's and KFOR's deployment the uncertainty over the final status of Kosovo has been a major handicap.¹⁶⁴ The overwhelming – Albanian – majority living in Kosovo vote for an independent state, but the overwhelming opinion of the rest of the region, with the exception of Albania and the Albanian minority in Macedonia, views this a dangerous and destabilizing idea.¹⁶⁵ However, technically under the Milosevic regime's agreement with the United Nations that ended the NATO air campaign, Kosovo remains part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,

¹⁶⁰ Nickname of Regulation No. 1999/1 in Kosovo: "The Mother of all Regulations." Alexandros Yannis, "Kosovo Under International Administration," in *Survival*, vol. 43, no. 2, Summer 2001, pp. 31-48, p. 32; Alexandros Yannis was Political Advisor to Bernard Kouchner, the first Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Kosovo, in the period July 1999 to December 2000. UNMIK = United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo

¹⁶¹ Alexandros Yannis, "Kosovo Under International Administration," p. 35

¹⁶² Ibid, p. 38

¹⁶³ Ibid, p. 45

¹⁶⁴ Ibid, p.36

¹⁶⁵ Carl Bildt, "A Second Chance in the Balkans," p. 154

and the new Yugoslavian political leaders undoubtedly regard Kosovo as an integral and inalienable part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁶ The challenge for UNMIK, which is responsible for the political settlement in Kosovo, thus remains to first install a stable political situation before future decisions concerning either reintegration of Kosovo into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or peaceful separation can be made.

The greatest challenge for a lasting peaceful settlement of the above mentioned conflicts and problems is the restoration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia itself. Here the economic and social challenges might be even worse than those in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A decade of war has brought more than 700.000 refugees, mostly Serbs, into the country, which not only adds further problems to the economy but is also a potential reservoir of revanchism if abandoned and ignored.¹⁶⁷ Different than in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Kosovo where political decisions are to a large extent dominated by external institutions as laid out before, the government and the people of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have to make their own decisions. It will be of great interest to compare the results achieved in these three different states, including the province of Kosovo, and to watch who will be more successful. So far the success for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia depends on successful privatization and economic reform, transformation of the military, police and judiciary, its relations with neighboring states and international institutions and the proof of a legitimate and credible government.¹⁶⁸

7. Conclusions and recommendations

The secession wars of the successor states of former Yugoslavia had a large influence on the development of the international understanding of policy and the role of military forces in the post Cold War period. NATO has adapted its roles and missions and has found its specific place

¹⁶⁶ Lenard J. Cohen, "Post-Milosevic Serbia," in *Current History*, March 2001, Vol. 100, No. 644, pp. 99-108, p. 105

¹⁶⁷ Carl Bildt, "A Second Chance in the Balkans," p. 153

¹⁶⁸ Eric D. Gordy, "Building a "Normal, Boring" Country: Kostunica's Yugoslavia," in *Current Affairs*, March 2001, Vol. 100, No. 644, pp. 109-113, p. 113

in the web of international security organizations and alliances. Starting in 1991 with the first new strategic concept, and at this time still being focused on the developments in the states of the former Soviet Union as well as in the states of the former Warsaw Pact, until today with its deployment of peace support troops in the Balkans and since 2001 for the first time in the existence of the Alliance in the state of Article 5 in consequence of the terror attacks of 11 September 2001, has demonstrated its adaptability to new security challenges.

To understand why decisions have been made always requires viewing them in their historical context and taking into consideration the background of acting persons and institutions as well. NATO's involvement in the conflicts of the successor states of former Yugoslavia followed a step by step approach and always in the political context of their time. The disillusion of political decision makers especially in Europe after three years of unsuccessful deployment of UNPROFOR under an insufficient mandate, coupled with ineffective decision making processes between the UN and NATO led to a different and much more robust approach.

NATO has always been a political alliance with the common goal of its members "to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, (...) resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security."¹⁶⁹ The policy and decisions of the alliance are driven by the decisions of their sovereign member states and each decision needs consensus. The decision to engage in full, first in Bosnia and Herzegovina and later in Kosovo was driven by the autonomous decision-making processes in the capitals of NATO's member states. The decision of France to no longer accept the humiliation of its peacekeepers by Serbia in 1995 and the decision of the United States to not accept a failure of the most important link of transatlantic partnership, the Alliance, during a at this time possible NATO support for evacuation operations of UNPROFOR, led to the consensus to accept the Alliance's mission of implementing and restoring peace in former Yugoslavia.

¹⁶⁹ North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C., 4th April 1949, preamble; *NATO Handbook*, p. 395

NATO's troops implemented a secure environment and until today provide the necessary conditions which allow for the political and economical organizations to do their work of longer lasting peace building. During the last seven years the size of the deployed troops and the command and control structures have been several times reshaped and downsized. But for the foreseeable future their presence will still be necessary. The implementation of the political structures and the economical reconstruction will need more time due to several reasons starting from problems inflicted by the former belligerents to bureaucratic delays because of competing interests of the organizations involved in this process. Mission changes and adaptations for the military forces were partly necessary and partly driven by events on the ground. NATO's credibility is interlinked with the successful implementation of the several political and economic agreements and initiatives. The aforementioned credibility of NATO which was on stake during the decision process to get involved is at stake today as well when it is necessary to refocus on other missions and challenges in the *post* "Post Cold War" era.

To be clearly stated, NATO's troops have fulfilled their initial missions. What is missing, are complementary results of all the other organizations involved. This does not mean that SFOR and KFOR can leave, since the paradox situation on the ground implies that they have to further on have to secure the environment. But that the same foreign and defense ministers – and on an occasionally basis the Heads of State and Government – of NATO who several times prolonged the deployments of their troops should develop greater pressure on their own governments as well as on the organizations involved in the peace process to provide the necessary means to foster the political processes in the successor states in former Yugoslavia, as for example the provision of sufficient and enough police forces.

The political decisions concerning the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina with its two entities and three ethnicities and the status of the Yugoslavian province Kosovo were appropriate at the time when they were made. However, instead of imposing conditions which might be neither in the interest of the people involved nor in those of the neighbor states a reconsideration should at

least been taken into consideration after an appropriate time. The developments in Croatia and especially in the Republic of Yugoslavia will provide the necessary political framework to put these questions under review again.

The recommendations concerning future involvement of NATO in the successor states of former Yugoslavia are twofold. Without doubt the Alliance has proven its value in providing political and military assistance to end the wars and install a secure environment. The political weight as a transatlantic alliance should be used to increase the pressure on the other organizations involved to proceed with their work and it should be made clear that NATO's presence on the ground must be reduced to the smallest extent possible to get troops and capabilities free for other more pressing issues on the international agenda.

Concerning the presence on the ground the Permanent Representatives, as already tasked, should focus on further streamlining the forces. This could include putting all missions in Bosnia Herzegovina, in Kosovo and in Macedonia as well under one command. This would set free headquarter capabilities, technically and even more important personally, and would offer the advantage to coordinate and assess the developments in the region via one command in the region instead of coordinating at AFSOUTH or SHAPE. It will be necessary to keep all nations involved, especially the United States, to further demonstrate NATO's commitment and reliability to the former conflicting parties. But the U.S. commitment could be reduced to a much smaller one as for example an appropriate amount of troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo in their sectors and by shifting the command for all NATO forces involved to a European commander as already successfully installed at KFOR. During this reshaping and restructuring process all mission changes, which - at the time when they occurred - were appropriate to successful implement the peace process should be reviewed, and wherever appropriate be cut back to the basic functions. Civil-Military cooperation has to be reduced to a level, which is necessary and should not longer hinder, although originally intended positively, that responsibilities of other or-

ganizations or - what is even more important of the people themselves - be not taken seriously enough.

NATO's military forces will have to face a longer commitment in the region since they are so far the only guarantee for a peaceful settlement and all political developments are relying on the secure environment they provide. But the focus has to shift. The centers of gravity, the governments of the successor states, are purely political. To get them to work or function is not the mission of military forces. Any exit strategy for NATO will have to take this into consideration. It should be accepted that this will take its time.

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